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ARTICLES




Leroy D. Clark *
The current period is a propitious time to assess the efficacy of civil rights
litigation and to chart the course of future developments. A number of com-
mentators have, indeed, undertaken the task of evaluating prior accomplish-
ments and anticipating future obstacles.' Some of these efforts have come in
the context of honoring the 200th anniversary of the American Constitution.
Other groups sense that advances in civil rights have reached a turning point
marked by a confusing mixture of successes and failures. To these observers,
successful future initiatives must be informed by a collective culling of the
fruitful strategies from those that were not productive. Problems con-
fronting those historically subjected to discrimination and prejudice have a
new character that calls for fresh, careful, and disciplined analysis. The raw
material is available for a full assessment. Legislation of the 1960's has fos-
tered over twenty years of active civil rights litigation, much of which oc-
curred at the "last word" stage of the United States Supreme Court. Also,
comprehensive research continues regarding the status of minorities to assist
in gauging the effectiveness of civil rights enforcement efforts.2 We also have
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., City College of New York, 1956; L.L.B., Columbia University, 1961.
This Article began as a summary report to the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law of their conference held in 1987 in which many leading litigators and scholars in the civil
rights field participated. The thinking of the participants became the springboard from which
many of my own ideas were generated. I am particularly indebted to Mr. William Robinson,
the current Dean of the Law School of the University of the District of Columbia and the
former Executive Director of the Lawyers' Committee for his support.
1. See, e.g., Greene, Twenty Years of Civil Rights: How Firm a Foundation 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1985) (focusing on developments in housing and employment
discrimination).
2. The United States Commission on Civil Rights is an independent, bipartisan agency,
established in 1957, which has developed studies to assess the impact of federal policy on
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the benefit of retrospection to test the optimistic, and perhaps naive, prem-
ises underlying civil rights statutes and subsequent litigation.
This Article focuses on the current law regarding civil rights in education,
employment, immigration, and voting with regard to blacks and Hispanics.
Discrimination against other groups (for example, females, the elderly, the
handicapped) is not explored except to the extent necessary to illuminate
discrimination against black and Hispanic minorities. The magnitude of the
subjects under discussion imposes this limitation, and any omission is not a
comment on the importance of other forms of discrimination. Housing dis-
crimination is not addressed because Congress enacted a new federal statute
as this Article developed.3 The statute has broader coverage and a vastly
improved remedial structure as written,4 but no body of litigation and re-
abating discrimination on the grounds of race and national origin. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS COMMITMENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF ENFORCE-
MENT RESOURCES AND PERFORMANCE (Clearinghouse Publication 82, 1983); U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF BLACK MEN IN AMERICA (Clearinghouse
Publication 91, 1986). Private research organizations have also been active. The National
Urban League has published the "State of Black America" yearly since 1977, and the Joint
Center for Political Studies in Washington, D.C. does excellent research on current problems
facing black Americans.
Black Americans apparently have been the subject of research studies more frequently than
Hispanics. As of 1988, for example, no organization had performed a major in-depth study of
employment and national origin similar to Freeman's study of blacks. R. FREEMAN,
CHANGES IN THE LABOR MARKET FOR BLACK AMERICANS, 1948-72, 67 (Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity No. 1, 1973); see A. SMITH, C. CRAVER & L. CLARK, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 66 (3d ed. 1988). The term "Hispanic" covers seven groups, which
differ from one another in socioeconomic terms, thus making generalization less useful. His-
panics generally are classified racially as "white," but some of the groups have persons darker
than some African-Americans, and may have black American or American Indian ancestry.
This may compromise a precise delimitation of the group in those research studies which rely
on self-identification. Moreover, a large portion of Hispanics illegally arrive in the country
and thus may avoid identification and study to protect themselves against deportation.
3. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3616 (West Supp. 1989)) [hereinafter FHAA].
4. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter Title VIII], prohib-
ited housing discrimination based on race and national origin. The FHAA addresses two
shortcomings of Title VIII; namely, it expands coverage and strengthens enforcement proce-
dures. The FHAA bars discrimination against the handicapped, which may cover persons
with AIDS, a disease that blacks have contracted in greater proportions than whites. 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 3604-3606. The FHAA also bars discrimination against children, which, in es-
sence, is a form of racial discrimination because minority households are more likely to have
children than nonminority households. Id. The most important improvements may be reme-
dial and procedural. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is no
longer limited solely to conciliation, but may now generate a United States Department of
Justice civil action on behalf of an aggrieved individual (thus also ending the previous limita-
tion of the Justice Department to "pattern and practice" litigation). Id. § 3610(c),(e). HUD
officials may also secure an expeditious hearing before an administrative law judge. Id.
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search exists yet to measure its actual impact and effectiveness. The Article
briefly summarizes the state of the law in each area identified above, but
primarily attempts to delineate new or unresolved problems of minorities,
and to suggest new ideas for litigation, legislation, or advocacy group reor-
ganization. This Article also attempts to gather together the ideas of other
commentators on the civil rights scene and critique those warranting some
qualifying commentary. This latter purpose entails some discussion of the
law as a vehicle for ameliorating poverty.
I. EDUCATION
Because the early strategists and architects of the legal front of the civil
rights movement focused most of their energies and resources on attacking
legal apartheid in education, it is appropriate to begin by exploring that era's
legacy of current problems of segregation and discrimination in schools. At
that time, litigation to end inferior education resulting from segregation was
tactically sound. A large portion of white Americans probably felt, in vary-
ing degrees of intensity, a troubled ambivalence about the morality of racial
subordination of blacks. The exposure of segregation as a desire to deliber-
ately deprive young people of an education probably deepened that ambiva-
lence, generating a wider pool of acceptance for a United States Supreme
Court decision to end state-sanctioned segregation in public schools.5 Inter-
nal debates raged within civil rights litigators' circles as to whether the
United States Supreme Court was ready for a frontal demand for full inte-
gration or whether continually chipping away at the "separate-but-equal"
doctrine was the wiser course.6 Fortunately, those urging an attack on seg-
regation as an inherent denial of equal protection carried the day, and the
Court also held unconstitutional a host of laws imposing racial segregation
on other aspects of communal life.7
§ 3612(d)(2). Furthermore, the FHAA raises the $1,000 cap imposed on punitive damages
under Title VIII to $10,000 for a first violation, $25,000 for a second violation, and $50,000 for
a third violation. Id. § 3612(g)(3). See generally Recent Developments-Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act of 1988, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 249 (1989).
5. The United States Supreme Court also understood that public acceptance of the deci-
sion on school desegregation was crucial. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), the Court sought to appeal to the moral conscience of the American public. See R.
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
6. See Carter, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, (Book Re-
view), 86 MICH. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
7. See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (ending racial segre-
gation in prisons), aff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidat-
ing statute prohibiting interracial marriage); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 220 F.2d 386
(4th Cir.) (ending racial segregation in public beaches and bath houses), aff'd, 350 U.S. 877
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During the early civil rights movement, the rationale was fairly straight-
forward in terms of the natural positive impact that desegregation in educa-
tion would bring. Maintenance of racial segregation relied critically on state
support and dismantling that support in education was viewed as the key to
freeing blacks from disadvantages in other areas. Equal educational oppor-
tunity would lead to enhanced skills and capabilities, which would lead to
better vocational and professional opportunities. Enhanced employment
would naturally result in higher income and concomitant equality in all
other areas of social life.
This straightforward common sense scenario typifies the prognosis made
in confronting racial discrimination in the other areas this Article examines,
including employment, voting, and amelioration of poverty. The actual
course of developments in the educational field demonstrates how a plausi-
ble, well-intentioned agenda can become undone or deflected by an unantici-
pated, underlying complexity in achieving widespread social change through
legal action.
A. The Consequences of the Court's Shifting Desegregation Strategies
Since Brown
Brown v. Board of Education 8 marked the first formal United States
Supreme Court acknowledgement that racially segregated public schools vi-
olated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.9 Immedi-
ate and complete cessation of unconstitutional conduct is the usual remedy
once the Court has found a violation. However, in Brown, the Court permit-
ted the process of desegregation to proceed gradually, "with all deliberate
speed."'" The Court implicitly recognized the massive reorganization of fa-
cilities, students, and teachers and the social-psychological adjustment that
the decision would engender. In fact, resistance over the ten years following
Brown proved to be the outcome. By 1964, only one-third of primarily bor-
der southern school districts had desegregated, and only 1.2% of black chil-
dren attended schools with white children in the deep south."
The Supreme Court demanded speedier and more complete compliance
with Brown. The Court held that school boards had an affirmative duty to
achieve a unitary system and thus could not rely exclusively on student-
initiated "freedom-of-choice" plans which resulted in minimal desegrega-
(1955); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 US. 879 (1955) (ending racial segregation on public
golf courses).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. Id. at 493; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
10, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), modifying 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN 33 (1977).
[Vol. 38:795
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tion. 12 Moreover, the Court could no longer accept the "deliberate speed"
formula, for the duty to fully desegregate existed "now."' 13 Accordingly, the
Court also held unconstitutional evasive schemes, such as the effort of a state
to underwrite the costs of white students attending segregated private
schools. 14
The Court then moved from its post-Brown posture of confrontation to-
ward a systematic approach; specifying with precision the ways in which a
de jure segregated system was to be transformed into a unitary system. This
approach created wider splits on the Court, and produced opinions contain-
ing more ambiguities and limitations on remedies than had been apparent
previously. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 5 the first
case in this vein, cautiously authorized reference to the proportion of blacks
to whites in a school system as a starting point in determining progress to-
ward desegregation, but quickly added that no specific degree of race mixing
was required, 6 While the Court would consider a school system fully deseg-
regated even where previously established one-race schools remained, the
Court still urged school officials to seek the fullest level of desegregation
possible.' 7 School officials were permitted to gerrymander school district
lines within "limits," but the Court never defined the parameters of those
limits.' 8 The Court permitted busing of students to achieve desegregation,
but vague references to "health" and "the educational process" restrained
complete reliance on this tool.' 9
Perhaps the most serious curtailment of remedies to achieve school deseg-
regation occurred in Milliken v. Bradley.2 0 A closely divided Supreme Court
held that where plaintiffs proved de jure segregation in a single urban school
district, surrounding suburban school districts, absent proof of segregation
that affected the urban district, could not be drawn into the plan in order to
achieve more complete desegration.2 ' In justifying this conclusion, the
Court claimed to be respecting the long-standing history of local control and
autonomy exercised by school boards."2 This reasoning ignored the fact that
12. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-41 (1968).
13. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam).
14. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1964).
15. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
16. Id. at 24.
17. Id. at 26.
18. Id. at 28.
19. Id. at 30-31.
20. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (5-4 decision).
21. Id. at 744-45.
22. Id. at 741.
1989]
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education was a state responsibility and that any meaningful integration of
students could not be achieved without resort to the suburban districts.
By the time Milliken was decided, an enormous population shift had in-
tensified in most urban areas with a sizeable black student population.
White occupants of urban areas moved to suburban areas or made greater
resort to private schools for their children when they remained in an urban
area.23 Thus, unless plaintiffs could prove that suburban school districts
participated with an urban school district in establishing or maintaining seg-
regation, Milliken, in effect, assured that the "white flight" would success-
fully thwart effective school integration. The Court, in Swann, also said that
although a school system may have been segregated deliberately at one time,
if resegregation occurred through demographic shifts, and without state en-
couragement, the school board had no further obligation to reorganize to
resecure integration.24 Presently, approximately 85% of African-Americans
live in metropolitan areas, and over two-thirds live in central cities.25 As of
1980, African-Americans represent more than 40% of the population in sev-
enteen cities.26 Thus, Swann allows a high degree of intra-urban segregation
to go unremedied absent proof that governmental action fostered the segre-
gation. Moreover, because the Court has always required proof that a delib-
erate state policy or practice resulted in racial segregation in schools,
northern and western school systems, which have never had a legally rein.-
forced dual school system, may not be constitutionally required to counter-
act de facto segregation.
B. Critical Response.: Toward Abandonment of Coerced Desegregation
Given the pattern of demographic shifts and legal developments, discus-
sion among civil rights advocates has begun to splinter in a number of direc-
tions which attempt to define the most fruitful responses. One direction has,
so far, been largely unsuccessful at the United States Supreme Court level.
As large-scale de facto racial and ethnic segregation began to characterize
many northern, midwestern, western, as well as southern, school systems,
civil rights advocates began to target disproportionate school district per-
pupil expenditures. They argued that a state's maintenance of some school
23. The suburban move was underway before Brown and was often generated by other
governmental initiatives, but the response to school desegregation added an impetus to the
process. See E. LARSON & L. McDONALD, THE RIGHTS OF RACIAL MINORITIES 101 (1980).
24. 402 U.S. 1, 25-27 (1971).
25. JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, THE METROPOLITAN AREA FACT BOOK, A
STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF BLACK AND WHITES IN URBAN AMERICA 6 (K. McFate, ed.
1988).
26. Id. at 21.
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districts, which received substantially lower per-pupil outlays than other dis-
tricts because of a taxing scheme that favored districts with wealthy property
owners, violated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
The United States Supreme Court denied this claim in San Antonio In-
dependent School District v. Rodriguez.2 7 The Court in Rodriguez set the
backdrop for another direction by finding that the Texas system of financing
public education did not discriminate against any identifiable traditionally
suspect, disadvantaged class,2" that it did not absolutely deprive any one of
state-sponsored education, and that affirmance would thus be an unwar-
ranted intrusion into the way "Texas has chosen to raise and disburse state
and local tax revenues."' 29 In rejecting the equal protection claim, the Court
issued a "cautionary postscript," warning of the "unprecedented upheaval
...[that] abrogation of traditional modes of financing education" would
cause.3 0 In conclusion, the Court did, however, write that "innovative
thinking as to public education, its methods and its funding" as a means of
assuring greater equality of opportunity was necessary.3 '
Professor Derrick Bell, probably the most comprehensive and active
scholar in the civil rights field today, claims that on a nationwide basis, at
least as of 1975, the overall achievement record of black children in desegre-
gated schools had not improved. 32 He has espoused the view that the cur-
rent agenda should emphasize a demand for higher quality education in
predominantly black schools. Bell bases his claim on a lack of definitive data
proving that excellence cannot be achieved in predominantly black schools
that are not the product of state-coerced dualism.33 Bell argues that one
must correct the other deficiencies which accompanied the segregated school
systems, in addition to racial separation, in order to upgrade the quality of
education of black children.34
27. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
28. Id. at 25-28.
29. Id. at 40.
30. Id. at 56.
31. Id. at 58.
32. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegrega-
tion Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 480 (1976). Prof. Bell cites N. St. John as stating: "During
the past 20 years considerable racial mixing has taken place in schools, but research has pro-
duced little evidence of dramatic gains for children and some evidence of genuine stress for
them." Id. at 480 n.31 (quoting N. ST. JOHN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION OUTCOMES FOR
CHILDREN 136 (1975)).
33. Bell, supra note 32, at 479 n.25.
34. Id. at 487-88. Bell argues that blacks were not only separated from whites, but black
schools were deprived of adequate and equal resources and parents were not involved in the
development of school policy. These deficiencies could be corrected even if black students
remained in predominantly black schools. Id.
1989]
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The evidence conflicts on this extremely controversial issue. Other civil
rights strategists assert that integration is critical to improved educational
performance by minorities.35 For example, some studies show that black
youngsters who have moved to predominantly white schools have higher
achievement levels than youngsters left behind in the single-race
environment. 36
Professor Bell has not given sufficient attention to two critical factors in
his provocative study. First, Bell does note one study in which some public
schools were able to teach poor children basic skills, but much of the data
shows that the socioeconomic levels of the students' families heavily influ-
ences success in education. Irrespective of students' race, schools attended
exclusively or predominantly by youngsters from poor families have lower
achievement levels than schools in which the students come from middle or
upper-class families.37 Bell mentions the experience of Dunbar High School,
a black high school in Washington, D.C., which reputedly produced a fair
number of students who performed at superior academic levels and subse-
quently achieved professional excellence.38 However, the children of black
middle-class families attended the school because segregation was being en-
forced at the time. 39 As black middle-class families increasingly leave black
ghetto areas, we confront the more problematic task of educating youngsters
in a single-race and single-class environment.
Professor Bell also fails to offer comment on the collateral consequences of
an integrated education that will not occur in a single-race school. In an
integrated situation, minority students potentially learn the extra-academic
social and cultural modes of the majority community (and vice versa) and
develop personal alliances that give access to information, jobs, or other op-
portunities. The general goal of racial harmony and understanding is dis-
served by distance and isolation of the races during the formative years. It is
true that in newly integrated schools there have been instances of internal
segregation of black students by the authorities or by the black students
themselves. Although resistance to desegregation by school officials who
35. Taylor, The Crucial Role of Education in Achieving the Civil Rights Goals of the
1980's, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 961 (1985).
36. See id. at 965-66.
37. Hodgson, Do Schools Make a Difference, in THE INEQUALITY CONTROVERSY:
SCHOOLING AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 26 (D. Levine & M.J. Bane eds. 1975). The study
Bell cites was unpublished, so it cannot be evaluated against other published works. It is
possible that special and concentrated efforts were engaged to counteract the negative environ-
mental factors.
38. Bell, supra note 32, at 479 n.25.
39. See Sowell, Black Excellence - The Case of Dunbar High School, 35 PUB. INTEREST 3,
5-6 (1974).
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would never have initiated the process themselves is natural, that resistance
merely calls for monitoring and vigilance by civil rights organizations. The
problem of racial hostility does not exist solely in the white community, and
black students must confront their own feelings of distrust and fear-at least
in an integrated school they can test themselves in this regard. After all,
upon leaving school, blacks will have to interact with whites in the working
world.
C. The Lawyers' Role in Contemporary Reform
1. Non-Litigation Participatory Approaches. The Washington Lawyers'
Committee on Civil Rights Under Law Model
However one comes out on the merits of the value of integrated education
versus improved quality education in de facto segregated schools, Bell cor-
rectly notes that the bulk of minority youngsters currently attending schools
in racial or ethnic isolation and the course of United States Supreme Court
decisions to date do not augur for much more desegregation in the future.4"
Given this state of affairs, it might be fruitful to model prospective efforts
along the lines adopted by the local Washington, D.C. unit of the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (Lawyers' Committee).4 ' This or-
ganization has supplied legal support for newly-organized parent groups
formed to seek improvements in their local educational establishments. At-
torneys have contributed to these groups' successful efforts to force schools
to make repairs and improvements rendering the premises usable and safe.4 2
In addition, they have helped to form and to counsel parent groups on effec-
tive intervention in the budget and collective bargaining processes. These
groups have achieved substantial increases in financial commitments to
schools and teacher salaries and have had an impact on improved teacher
accountability.43 Attorneys have also structured a parent-supervised fund to
which local corporations have made contributions.44 The fund was designed
to enable a community with many low income families to provide additional
educational options, much in the way that middle-class families supplement
a school system's resources with their own contributions. The bulk of the
lawyers' activities did not involve litigation, but rather the rendering of legal
advice as, in effect, "house counsel" to parents' groups and establishment of
40. Bell, supra note 32, at 478-80.
41. See Sellers, Public Education Legal Services Project. A Private Sector Initiative in the
Area of Public Education, 27 How. L.J. 1471 (1984).
42. Id. at 1483-84.
43. Id. at 1485-86, 1489.
44. Id. at 1486, 1490-92.
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a cooperative relationship with the board of education and the superinten-
dent of schools.4 5
2. New Directions in Litigation: Alternate Sources of a
"Right" to Education
The Lawyers' Committee strategy stresses nonlitigation approaches.
However, some suggest that litigation in a recast form may recoup the defeat
sustained in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the con-
stitutionally based school finance case.46 The losses in that case may have
flowed, in part, from the Court's view that no constitutionally based "right"
to education existed and that no standards existed upon which to measure
the state's educational failures in minority-dominated schools.4 7 Recent re-
form legislation, however, has sought to establish minimum standards for
student performance.48 Efforts to establish a student's "right" to state edu-
cational support adequate to ensure that the student will have the capacity to
meet the new standards may be based upon this type of legislation. Under
this approach, deficient public schools would violate state law if they pro-
duce a disproportionate number of failing students.4 9
It may be argued that in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court merely addressed
the need to tolerate relative disadvantages between student performance in
different school districts in deference to the local control principle, while
leaving unanswered the question of whether there was a federal constitu-
tional right to a bedrock of minimally adequate education. The argument
in favor of recognizing such a constitutional right might be reinforced by
reference to the impact that the absence of an adequate education has on a
45. For early experiments with this new role on behalf of lawyers working with disadvan-
taged groups, see Clark, House Counsel for the Poor-An Experiment in Clinical Legal Educa-
tion, 17 How. L.J. 614 (1973).
46. 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see also supra text accompanying note 27-31.
47. In Rodriguez, the Court said: "Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is
implicitly so protected." Id. at 35. The Court also questioned whether higher financial ex-
penditures in a school district automatically translated into a higher quality education. Id. at
23-24.
48. JONES - WILSON, The State of Urban Education, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA
1984, 95-118 (1984) (by 1978, 36 states had adopted some minimum standards for student
performance); see also Chambers, Adequate Education for All: A Right, an Achievable Goal, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 55 (1987).
49. For a full and careful development of this new approach in arguing for a "right" to
education, see Chambers, supra note 48.
50. 411 U.S. at 54-55. The Court's statements on a constitutional right to education may
be dictum because the State of Texas in Rodriguez claimed that they provided a minimally
"adequate" education for all children and the Court found that the plaintiffs had not refuted
the State's assertion. Id. at 24.
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citizen's capacity to exercise other constitutional rights, such as the right to
free speech or the right to participate in elections on an equal basis.
All of these suggestions are subject to criticism. One could seriously ques-
tion the likelihood of success of the federal constitutional claims. Recently,
the United States Supreme Court further reinforced the position that the
fourteenth amendment does not obligate a state to neutralize poverty as a
barrier to state educational benefits when it ruled that there is no duty to
provide busing for children to attend public schools when indigent families
cannot afford the fee charged.51
While some state courts provide a more hospitable forum to pursue claims
on behalf of the disadvantaged than the Supreme Court, it may be necessary
to question the ultimate impact of the recent legislation adopted under the
banner of "reform" before pursuing such litigation. Retaining students who
perform poorly in a grade may have a "no nonsense, get tough" ring, but
practically, such a reform could accelerate the rate of school dropouts by
youngsters who feel humiliated and defeated. Further, pursuit of state law
claims presents a difficult question regarding the adequacy of possible reme-
dies. Some educational experts report that the precise changes that must be
instituted to achieve a higher quality of education are unclear, especially for
youngsters from disadvantaged backgrounds. For example, despite conclu-
sions suggested by a common sense appraisal, some research finds no consis-
tent and clear improvement in student achievement solely through devoting
greater financial resources to the public schools.5 2
The picture, however, is not completely bleak. Some initiatives have
demonstrated success, including active involvement of parents in the direc-
tion of schools, recruitment of bright, motivated teachers who do not cast
negative projections on minority students in terms of the students' potential,
and maintenance of minimum levels of orderliness and discipline. 53 How-
ever, a number of other methods of organizing or administering a school
system exist that have received energetic support from some educators but
have been rejected strenuously by others. The list of controversial methods
include voucher systems to permit parental selection of schools, stiffened
graduation requirements, and merit pay for or competency testing of teach-
51. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988).
52. H. AVERUCH, S. CARROLL, T. DONALDSON, H. KIESLING & J. PINCUS, How EF-
FECTIVE IS SCHOOLING? A CRITICAL REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS xii,
xiii (1972); see also infra text accompanying notes 55-59.
53. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY EDUCATION POLICY, MAKING THE GRADE (1983). Considerable evidence dem-
onstrates that the Head Start program, providing pre-first grade education, has given poor and
minority youngsters educational gains which have been sustained over time. See also J. OGBU,
MINORITY EDUCATION AND CASTE (1978).
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ers. 4 The frequent claim that other socioeconomic conditions besides
poorly structured schools contribute to produce high dropout rates, lowered
achievement scores, and disrupted classes in minority schools, compounds
the problems of choosing the most efficacious means of improving education.
Young people in ghetto neighborhoods confront peers who devalue educa-
tion and who may rely on crime and violence to solve problems. These stu-
dents are also more likely to come from broken homes and lack adequate
housing, medical care, and nutrition. All of these conditions manifest them-
selves in the school system in a manner that short-circuits or impairs the
teaching process.
Given the uncertain availability of judicial remedies for these problems
when presented in their full dimensions, it is possible that a court, even a
state court, may hesitate to attempt a resolution viewing them as legislative
problems rather than judicial problems. One branch of scholarship, how-
ever, suggests that the most obvious and immediate legislative response -
devoting increased resources to education - may not be the most effective
means of securing the collateral economic benefits of an adequate education.
D. The Uncertain Effect of Increased Educational Expenditures
The work of a group of social scientists under Christopher Jencks' leader-
ship poses a serious challenge to the common premise that increased finan-
cial resources to schools will indirectly, but substantially, diminish the gap
between white and black incomes.55 After a study of the Coleman Report,56
Jencks concluded that, despite a steady decrease in the gap in material re-
sources and personnel expenditures between black and white schools, an
enormous gap remained between black and white incomes. 57 Jencks sug-
gested that direct income redistribution policies more effectively reduced
poverty than providing schools with greater resources.5"
54. See JONES-WILSON, supra note 48, at 105-10.
55. C. JENCKS, M. SMITH, H. ACLAND, M. BANE, D. COHEN, H. GINTIs, B. HEYNS & S.
MICHELSON, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMIY AND SCHOOLING IN
AMERICA 29, 93-97, 188-90 (1972) [hereinafter C. JENCKS].
56. OFFICE OF EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, EQUALITY OF
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966) [hereinafter COLEMAN REPORT]. The report found that
there were minimal differences between the physical facilities, formal curricula, and measura-
ble characteristics of teachers between black and white schools and that these small differences
had little effect on the significant differences between black and white students' performances
on standardized tests. The key variable appeared to be the lack of access to resources that poor
black students had compared to classmates from affluent homes.
57. C. JENCKS, supra note 55, at 23-29. "Neither family background, cognitive skill, edu-
cational attainment, nor occupational status explains much of the variation in men's incomes."
Id. at 226.
58. Id. at 230-32.
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The Jencks' thesis has been subjected to strenuous attack and reinterpreta-
tion. His conclusions do not go so far as to suggest that a lack of scholastic
credentials do not operate as a barrier to securing employment. Rather, he
maintains that increased educational expenditures did not amount to strong
determinants of post-school incomes within particular groups once a person
had obtained employment. 9 Therefore, improvements in schools that de-
crease dropout rates, for example, might very well affect access to employ-
ment, and consequentially, income. And because unemployment is
disproportionately visited upon minorities, lack of a gateway educational
credential will definitely adversely affect these groups. If Jencks correctly
asserts that income redistribution policies are a more efficacious way to con-
front poverty, then we are again pointed to the arena of legislation. But
while most legislators would have little difficulty enacting modest increases
in educational expenditures, civil rights activists choosing Jencks' course
face the more difficult political challenge of influencing various elected bod-
ies to reorient public policy in the direction of income redistribution.
II. EMPLOYMENT
Those who resist racial and ethnic integration of schools, and most assur-
edly of residential neighborhoods, do so not solely because of racial and eth-
nic prejudice, but in part because of their hostility to the concomitant
integration of the lower class with middle and upper classes which educa-
tional and residential integration would produce. Assertion of hostility
along class lines is often muted in American society by the myth that we are
a classless society with fluid status largely determined by an individual's in-
telligence, industry, and initiative. According to this stereotype, poverty vis-
its only the lazy, the unambitious, and the parasitic. Indeed, one
determinant of status may be the extent to which an individual can create
physical distance from the poor by changing neighborhoods or schools. As
long as these attitudes sustain themselves, African-Americans and Hispanics
will encounter barriers to integration into middle and upper-class
institutions.
Litigation aimed at eliminating discrimination in employment opportuni-
ties appears to offer a natural, if indirect, means of overcoming these percep-
tual barriers, thus achieving widespread institutional integration. Logic
suggests that as African-Americans and Hispanics ascend the income ladder
59. To illustrate, white workers earn about 50% more than black workers. But the best
paid fifth of all white workers earns more than 600% more than the worst paid fifth. This
distance between white workers is not explained by differences in the quality of education. See
Hodgson, supra note 37, at 39.
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they will command the financial resources necessary to secure housing in
white suburban areas and will achieve school integration as a consequence of
residence.
Despite substantial advances since passage of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,' however, this hope remains unrealized. Focusing solely on the
black community, outlawing open, racial discrimination in employment has
substantially improved the economic fortunes of vast numbers of blacks.
Yet these improvements have been isolated and have not benefited the entire
black community. Indeed, evidence shows growth in the proportion of the
black population living below the poverty line, as well as an intensification of
poverty, since the 1970's.6 1 Some other data shows evidence of retrogression
in the last ten to twelve years, running across the Carter and Reagan admin-
istrations.62 Professor Alfred Blumrosen, however, points to data showing
nearly 25% of the minority workforce in higher paying jobs in 1980 than
they would have been under the occupational distribution that existed in
1965.63 Therefore, the passage of Title VII and the subsequent litigation it
fostered has apparently had some positive impact in terms of opening em-
ployment opportunities for some portions of the black community. We now
face the challenge of expanding those opportunities to members of the bur-
geoning underclass.
A. Title VII and the Court: Progress and Retrenchment
Under the current federal statute prohibiting employment discrimination,
few opportunities for progressive litigation that would benefit the plaintiff
class remain. The statute is now so mature and developed in interpretation
that any areas of uncertainty which could be clarified to benefit the plaintiff
class appear to have been exhausted, and any future advances will probably
require new or amended legislation, especially in light of some recent deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court.
60. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-718, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)).
61. The most comprehensive documentation can be found in W. WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED-THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 46-62 (1987).
See also Lauter & May, A Saga of Triumph, A Return to Poverty. Black Middle Class has
Grown but Poor Multiply, L.A. Times, Apr. 2, 1988, § 1, at 16, col. 1 (Since 1969, the percent-
age of black men, ages 25 through 55, who earned less than $5,000 rose from 8% to 20%.).
62. See Williams, Urban League Says Blacks Suffered Loss Over Decade, N.Y. Times, Jan.
15, 1988, at A10, col. 1.
63. Blumrosen, Rethinking the Civil Rights Agenda: Impressions of the Rutgers Law
School Conference, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 1117, 1122 (1985).
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With the exception of a few recent cases,' 4 courts, including the Supreme
Court, have liberally construed the statute to facilitate its remedial goals.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,65 the most important Title VII case to date, estab-
lished a very critical doctrine declaring unlawful those employment practices
that have a disparate and adverse impact on minorities and females unless
the employer can demonstrate that reliance on such practices achieves some
valid employment goal.6 6 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green67 established a
simple and direct procedure enabling a plaintiff to sustain a prima facie case
when alleging intentional discrimination.68 The Supreme Court also estab-
lished a rough presumption that a prevailing plaintiff was entitled to an
award of back pay and attorney's fees, and made the defendant's recovery of
attorney's fees more difficult.69
64. See infra notes 70-71, 73-76 and accompanying text.
65. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
66. Id. at 436. The Court recently extended the Griggs analysis to encompass screening
by subjective evaluation where the net effect is a disparate impact. Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988). There are, however, conclusions and some ambigu-
ous language that may be troubling from a plaintiff's perspective. For the first time, the Court
clearly stated that after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case through showing that an em-
ployment practice adversely affects his group, the burden of proof does not shift to the defend-
ant (as the dissent vigorously argued). The defendant must merely produce enough evidence
to create an issue of fact. Moreover, the plaintiff has the duty of identifying, with precision,
the particular employment practices that caused the disproportionate loss of a job opportunity
or benefit when a number of factors influence the employment decision. This holding could be
criticized on the ground that this information is more accessible to the defendant. The Court
also claimed that tests need not always be validated to prove that they are measures of charac-
teristics needed to perform the job, but did not make clear the circumstances under which the
relaxation of this requirement would occur. The lack of clarity was compounded by the cita-
tion to Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which was decided under the equal protec-
tion component of the due process clause of the fifth amendment, and thus did not apply the
more stringent limitations of the "business necessity" concept utilized in Title VII cases.
67. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
68. Id. at 802. To establish a prima facie case, the complainant must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id.
69. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 109
S. Ct. 1486, 1492 (1989), reinforced this trend by overruling lower court decisions that barred
the prevailing plaintiff from recovering attorney's fees if he did not succeed on the "central
issue" in the case. The Court stated that plaintiffs may recover attorney's fees if they prevail
on "any significant issue." Id. at 1493. Although the case involved an interpretation of the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), the courts have
often interpreted the attorney's fees portion of Title VII as having the same goals as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. See, e.g., Salone v. United States, 645 F.2d 875, 879 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
894 (1981); Denton v. Boilermakers Local 29, 673 F. Supp. 37, 52 (D. Mass. 1987).
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A few decisions prior to the 1988-89 Supreme Court term giving the civil
rights plaintiffs' bar cause for distress have either generated congressional
amendments to Title VII or have not had lasting consequences. For exam-
ple, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 70 the Court interpreted the term "sex"
as excluding discrimination against females on the basis of pregnancy, 7' but
Congress quickly amended the statute to provide such protection. 72 In
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,73 the Court held
that seniority systems which had a disparate impact did not violate Title VII
because Congress had sought to preserve seniority systems against such at-
tacks in a special provision of Title VII.74 This decision has a diminished
influence as time passes because it basically preserves the (unfair, if not un-
lawful) advantage given to that small portion of the population who have
seniority credits accumulated as a consequence of being hired prior to 1964,
when minorities and females were discriminatorily barred from many areas
of employment. East Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc. v. Rodriguez75
raised concerns that the Supreme Court was imposing stringent limitations
on the breadth of the class that a plaintiff could represent.76 However, the
ruling could reasonably be interpreted as merely requiring that the plaintiff
represent only the class of persons who have suffered from the same kind of
discrimination (e.g. hiring vs. promotion) visited on that plaintiff. If a par-
ticular practice is systematic and ongoing, the plaintiff should be permitted
to locate and join others who have endured discrimination in other facets of
the employment process to broaden the scope of the class action. Moreover,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is not bound by
class action restrictions and has authority to bring a suit that encompasses
any and all discriminatory practices engaged in by a given employer.77
The EEOC employs broad supportive interpretations of Title VII in areas
that have not been fully litigated, and the courts give some deference to these
interpretations. 78 Moreover, despite some initial threats from the chairper-
son of the EEOC during the Reagan administration, the interpretive guide-
lines promulgated during earlier administrations, which give extensive
70. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
71. Id. at 136.
72. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 701(k) Title VII, 92 Stat.
2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)).
73. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
74. Id. at 353-55.
75. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
76. Id. at 404-05.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1982).
78. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). But see Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 89-90 (1981) (refusing to give full
effect to an EEOC interpretation because it conflicted with an earlier interpretation).
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protection to classes protected under the statute, have not undergone whole-
sale revision.7 9 With three ominous, recent exceptions," ° the Court has gen-
erally assured plaintiffs access to a wide range of affirmative action relief.81
Some of the affirmative action cases, however, involved close decisions.
Professor Eleanor H. Norton, a former chairperson of the EEOC, propheti-
cally cautioned just prior to the 1988-89 term that the "danger lies in the
scraping, trimming, and chipping away that could reduce the potency of
these [affirmative action] decisions as they are interpreted in decisions yet to
come." 2 During the 1988-89 term, a conservative majority emerged on the
Supreme Court that possibly will end the liberal, pro-plaintiff interpretations
of civil rights statutes and the fourteenth amendment which have occurred
in the past. President Reagan, appointing three justices to the United States
Supreme Court, is generally charged with breaching much of the bipartisan
support for civil rights that existed over the course of twenty years following
passage of the 1960's civil rights legislation. The Court, with the new Rea-
gan appointees, decided five cases: Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,s3
Martin v. Wilks, s4 Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,8 5 Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union, 86 and Jett v. Dallas Independent School District.87 These
cases all interpret civil rights statutes in a manner that may prompt civil
rights organizations to demand legislative redress. A sixth case, City of
79. See Norton, Equal Employment Law: Crisis in Interpretation-Survival Against the
Odds, 62 TUL. L. REV. 681, 707-08 (1988).
80. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (discussed infra notes
101-04 and accompanying text); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)
(placing modifications on affirmative action relief); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
81. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (supporting affirmative
action); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986)
(same); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (same).
82. See Norton, supra note 79, at 700. See generally, WOMEN EMPLOYED INST., JUSTICE
DENIED: THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION UNDER THE REAGAN AD-
MINISTRATION, reprinted in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Policies Regarding
Goals and Timetables in Litigation Remedies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment
Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 184-213 (1986).
For the most comprehensive documented analysis done, see N. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (1988).
83. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). Each of the five cases interpreting civil rights statutes had the
narrowest majority possible, showing the impact of President Reagan's last appointee, Justice
Kennedy.
84. 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
85. 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989).
86. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
87. 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
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Richmond v. .A. Croson Co., 8 8 also adverse to the claims made on behalf of
minorities, involved an interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.
Of all these cases, Wards Cove Packing Co. may pose the greatest difficulty
for plaintiffs under Title VII. Indeed, the Court held that even after a plain-
tiff proves that an employment practice has had an adverse impact on minor-
ities, the burden of proof does not shift to the defendant employer to show
that the practice fulfilled a legitimate business purpose, but rather continues
to rest with the plaintiff who now bears the additional burden of proving that
the practice did not serve any valid business goal.89 In Martin, the Court
held that a consent decree approving an affirmative action plan was not res
judicata with respect to white employees who had not been a party to, or an
intervenor in, the litigation.9" In Lorance, the Court held that when a plain-
tiff claims that a seniority plan discriminates against minorities, the plaintiff
must, for purposes of the statute of limitations under Title VII, challenge the
plan when it is adopted, not when it is implemented. 9'
Next, the Court decided Patterson, which held that section 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 continues to prohibit discriminatory refusals to
enter into a contract, but does not govern discriminatory implementation or
practices once the contract is in place.92 Finally, the Court in Jett held that
an employee who alleges discrimination may not sue public employers under
the section 1981 claim of respondeat superior.93 Rather, the Court required
the plaintiff to prove (as required under section 1983) that the state official
who made the employment decision had policy making authority or was
acting pursuant to government policy. 9a
These cases provide an opportunity for a legislative response. Which case
represents the best candidate remains highly speculative because, in some
instances, a clear judgment as to whether a case creates serious roadblocks to
remedies against discrimination may only emerge after future litigation.
Therefore, extensive comment on these cases would be premature. More-
over, securing legislative redress may also be difficult because the cases re-
solve matters with a "technical" cast that some members of Congress may
feel are best left to the courts.
Wards Cove, however, seemingly presents the greatest need for amending
Title VII. Individuals proceeding through private counsel may, as a practi-
88. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
89. 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989).
90. 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2188 (1989).
91. 109 S. Ct. 2261, 2268-69 (1989).
92. 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2372-73 (1989).
93. 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2721 (1989).
94. Id. at 2722.
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cal matter, be unable to afford the cost of retaining experts to carry the bur-
den of proving that a business practice serves no legitimate goal. Moreover,
the defendant who has adopted the allegedly discriminatory business prac-
tice is in a better position to prove the need for the practice.95
Patterson and Jett, although less urgent, also create a need to address the
limitations that the Court has placed on section 1981. In Patterson, the
Court declined to overrule Runyon v. McCrary,96 which had previously in-
terpreted section 1981 as prohibiting private entities, such as employers,
from discriminatorily refusing to enter into contracts with minorities. Ex-
ploration continues concerning the range of discriminatory commercial rela-
tionships which, despite not being designated as "employment," and,
therefore, escaping the reach of Title VII, may be prohibited by section 1981
as "contractual." Overruling Runyon would have stifled this exploration.
For example, section 1981 may reach appointments to the board of directors
of a corporation or the retention of a host of independent contractors such as
arbitrators and sports agents. However, the initial problem in most in-
stances for minorities is securing these contractual opportunities, and Patter-
son did not preclude reliance on section 1981 for these types of cases.97
Jett also may not present a need for legislative action. Under Jett, if an
official engages in the kind of intentional employment discrimination one
would have to prove to prevail under section 1981, even absent proof of a
governmental policy, such conduct would violate Title VII. 98 Moreover, the
statute, because it was passed in a post-slavery context, is limited to race-
based claims. As a result, generating broad support for amendment to Title
VII, which in practical terms would be viewed as benefiting only blacks,
would be difficult.
95. See Professor Robert Belton's insightful comment: "A review of the discrimination
cases also suggests that the burden of proof issue may well be the battleground upon which
some judges are attempting to repudiate the disparate impact theory of discrimination." Bel-
ton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural
Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1209 (1981).
96. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
97. Patterson asserted a claim of racial harassment by her employer. The claim did not
entail a refusal by the employer to enter into a contract of employment because of race. As a
result, the Court reasoned that section 1981 did not provide a cause of action. Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2372-73 (1989). It is not, however, a complete re-
sponse to reason that Patterson could have pursued this claim under Title VII. Unlike section
1981, Title VII does not permit damages solely for harassment. However, it may be difficult to
secure an amendment to section 1981 to negate Patterson to allow damages for racial harass-
ment unless activists also seek an amendment to Title VII to permit damages for sexual harass-
ment, the latter of which may present a more widespread problem.
98. Jett, 109 S. Ct. at 2722.
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Martin has been criticized because it potentially will destabilize longstand-
ing affirmative action decrees. However, the decision may merely state the
unremarkable proposition that persons cannot have their legal rights deter-
mined without having their day in court.99 Indeed, proponents of an amend-
ment to preclude a nonparty from attacking a decree might meet opposition
from those claiming that such an amendment would violate due process of
law.
Lorance also may not generate support for amending Title VII. Despite
the defeat the Lorance plaintiffs suffered, subsequent plaintiffs now know
that when an employer adopts a seniority system that adversely affects them,
they must immediately file suit."° At most, one might seek an amendment
that shifts the challenge date to the date of implementation if the discrimina-
torily impacted plaintiff cannot ascertain the adoption date. Early litigation,
however, does present some advantages because a court will determine the
legality of the seniority system before anyone relies on the system to dis-
tribute benefits to employees, thereby avoiding a difficult unraveling process.
Finally, the Court in Croson held that an affirmative action ordinance
designed to guarantee minority businesspersons a portion of city contracts
violated the fourteenth amendment because the city had failed to establish
an adequate record of prior discrimination against such businesspersons to
justify an explicitly racial remedy.' Only the arduous process of a consti-
tutional amendment can correct this case. The wisdom of attempting an
amendment would be suspect because the Court soundly reasoned (argua-
bly) the proper factual predicate for an affirmative action plan."0 2 Indeed,
an article the Court cited by Professor Drew Days, a former head of the
Justice Department's Civil Rights division and who is widely respected in
civil rights circles, probably supplied the theoretical underpinning of the de-
99. Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2184 (1989).
100. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261, 2268-69 (1989).
101. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 727 (1989).
102. The Supreme Court held, for the first time, that state action which disadvantages
whites will be subjected to strict scrutiny, even if the municipal legislation is designed to repair
discrimination against minorities. Id. at 723. The Court opens itself to serious criticism be-
cause it has said previously that the strict scrutiny standard applied only when a group had
been "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). This hardly describes the class of white, male businessmen whom
the plaintiff represented in Croson. However, the Court's jurisprudence on the equal protec-
tion clause will unlikely be seen as a paramount target for a constitutional amendment, espe-
cially given the current controversy surrounding affirmative action and claims of "reverse
discrimination."
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cision.103 Moreover, the Court in Croson appeared to accept the proposition
that Congress might legislate affirmative action plans on a slimmer factual
basis than states and municipalities.'" Thus, perhaps federal legislation is
the least problematic way to achieve increased contractual opportunities for
minority businesspersons.
B. Reforming Antidiscrimination Law and Procedure: Lessons
from Labor Law
1. Creating a Right of Immediate Relief and the Problem
of Displaced Workers
Numerous opportunities exist to improve plaintiffs' relief and to stream-
line enforcement of employment discrimination laws. These departures can
probably only be achieved by legislation. The EEOC, under the Reagan ad-
ministration, proposed that discriminatory refusal of employment entitled a
plaintiff to back pay and immediate hiring or reinstatement, even if it re-
quired the discharge of the person given the position the plaintiff sought.'0 5
In the circuit courts that have dealt with the issue, the law is fairly settled
that the plaintiff must await the development of a vacancy before he can be
hired.' °6 The stance of the circuits, however, does not make the plaintiff
whole because postponing job experience may detrimentally affect an em-
ployee with respect to subsequent promotions and other opportunities.
The remedial provisions of Title VII were modeled on those of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA), °7 and the courts have relied on deci-
sions by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as a guide for the
interpretation of Title VII where they find an analogous problem.' 0 8 Under
the NLRA, refusing to hire or discharging a person solely because of his
engagement in lawful union activity constitutes an unfair labor practice.'0 9
If such an unfair labor practice charge is found to have merit, the employee
103. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719 (citing Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987)).
104. 109 S. Ct. at 719-20.
105. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.27 1(a)(3)-(4) (1988); see also Equal Employment Opportunity in
the Federal Government; Complaints of Discrimination, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,920-22 (1987)
(EEOC comments regarding back pay and immediate rehiring).
106. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579 n.11 (1984)
("[liower courts have uniformly held that relief for actual victims does not extend to bumping
employees previously occupying jobs").
107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982).
108. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419-21 (1975). Indeed, the Court
in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. said: "To the extent that there is a difference in the
wording of the respective [remedial] provisions, § 706(g) [of Title VII] grants, if anything,
broader discretionary powers than those granted the [NLRB]." 424 U.S. 747, 769 n.39 (1976).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941).
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has a right to immediate reinstatement, even if reinstatement means that
another person who received the job during the dispute would be bumped. "o
Likewise, employees who strike in protest of an unfair labor practice have a
right to reinstatement over workers hired as replacements during the
strike."' Arguably, Title VII and the NLRA do not address perfectly
analogous circumstances. Immediate hiring or reinstatement may be neces-
sary in the NLRA context in order to prevent employees other than the
complainant from being intimidated into avoiding union activity. Similarly,
the knowledge of racial or gender discrimination and a long delayed remedy
may likewise deter minorities or women from seeking employment with a
discriminating employer who appears to have successfully flouted the law in
practical terms. "2 Moreover, the labor movement has found that even
broader remedial relief inadequately deters unfair labor practices in which
employees have lost employment. Thus, the unions pushed, unsuccessfully,
for stiffer relief (double back-pay) in labor reform legislation in 1978.1'
Any new legislation seeking to perfect the plaintiff's remedy should ad-
dress the "innocent victim" problem by giving a displaced person a cause of
action against the employer. Relief may take the form of continued pay
until the displaced person finds suitable, substitute employment. While a
displaced person may not suffer as fully as a victim of arbitrary discrimina-
tion, the discriminating employer has still placed the displaced worker in a
position of innocent and detrimental reliance and has improperly raised the
displaced employee's expectations."'
110. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 54 (1954).
111. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 286 (1956). Workers who end a strike
designed solely to improve working conditions (economic strikers) have to await a vacancy
when others have been hired in their place. The Court has held that hiring a replacement is
not, in itself, an unfair labor practice, but is merely a legitimate and lawful countermeasure to
the strike, thus permitting the delay. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345
(1938).
112. The possibility is greater that a replacement, hired because of employer resistance to
unionization, may have more "notice" of the fact that he is coming into a place involved in a
labor dispute than a person who is hired when another has, without his knowledge, refused
jobs discriminatorily on the grounds of race or national origin.
113. See Bredhoff, Labor Law Reform: A Labor Perspective, 20 B.C.L. REV. 27, 56 (1978).
114. Innocent persons who are discharged under the proposed amended civil rights legisla-
tion may have an independent cause of action in some states for breach of contract. The
Court, in an analogous situation, said that such suits under state law are preempted by the
NLRA where an innocent party is discharged pursuant to a NLRB order to reinstate an em-
ployee whose firing was an unfair labor practice. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 512
(1983). The proposal here, however, would give a federal cause of action and not remit the
innocent parties to the vagaries of state laws.
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2. Authorizing EEOC to Conduct Hearings and to Grant
Injunctive Relief
Another reform ripe for legislative action would be to grant the EEOC
authority equivalent to that vested in the NLRB; specifically, to hold adver-
sarial hearings and to issue cease and desist orders." 5 This authority was
part of the original Title VII proposal, but was withdrawn in a compromise
to assure passage of the legislation." 6 Therefore, at present, the EEOC only
has authority to file suit in federal court." 7 Given the experience with Title
VII and the fact that substantial elements of the business community have
learned to live with it, it is possible that opposition to the proposal has di-
minished."' A number of commentators have speculated that an EEOC
empowered with cease and desist orders might obtain speedier resolutions
similar to the relative dispatch with which the NLRB resolves matters
before it." 9 Experience, however, prompts a caveat that the option of pri-
vate suits, as an alternative remedy, precludes a monopoly over enforcement
by an administration that might be hostile to the goals of the reformed
legislation.
The foregoing discussion of plaintiffs' remedies in litigation and of the
NLRB's independent remedial powers raises a critical collateral question as
to whether it is counterproductive for the EEOC to focus too much of its
energy on individual cases in federal court or whether broader regulatory
and enforcement roles should be mandated. However, even if it is more de-
sirable for private attorneys to pursue most of the individual cases rather
than the EEOC, current conditions point to a pressing need for measures to
strengthen the plaintiff's bargaining and litigation position. The measures
proposed here would make prompt and full relief a meaningful option and
would reduce the present loss of momentum in the progressive evolution of
civil rights law.
115. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)-(m) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
116. See 109 CONG. REC. 13,127 (1963) (statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier of Wiscon-
sin); see also H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 42, 57 (additional views of Rep. Kas-
tenmeier and Rep. George Meader of Michigan), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2411, 2426.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982).
118. See Affirmative Action: Joint Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Employment
Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 223-39 (1985)
(testimony of the National Association of Manufacturers supporting affirmative action).
119. See Clark, Insuring Equal Opportunity in Employment Through Law, in RETHINKING
EMPLOYMENT POLICY 173, 185-88 (D. Bawden & F. Skidmore eds. 1989). Prof. Eleanor
Norton (a former Chair of the EEOC) cautions that under the Reagan Administration a case
backlog has developed, so the agency would have to be given sufficient resources to handle the
new responsibility. See Norton, supra note 79, at 681 n.3.
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C. Revitalizing Private Social Action Litigation
Despite the fact that the EEOC has had authority, since 1972, to file suit
in federal court, 120 the majority of employment discrimination actions have
been brought by private attorneys and public interest law firms. 12 1 During
the Reagan years, the number of complaints filed with the EEOC increased,
yet the EEOC has filed suit in the federal courts less frequently than under
prior administrations. 122 The slackened performance of the federal agency
appears to be attributable to poor management, reliance on the quicker route
of compromise settlements in one-on-one cases, and major reductions in
funding and staff.'2 3 For the most part, only a new administration that re-
turns to a bipartisan commitment to vigorous enforcement of the civil rights
laws can address these matters.
A dwindling number of major class actions brought by "private attorneys
general" has exacerbated the Federal Government's abdication of an aggres-
sive enforcement role. As a stopgap, if not a substitute measure, creation of
a system of private incentives and information analysis could help to offset
the slowdown in public enforcement by revitalizing private antidiscrimina-
tion litigation.
1. Liberalizing the Award of Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees in
Antidiscrimination Suits
The average plaintiff in an employment discrimination case lacks adequate
financial resources to support litigation, especially complex, class action liti-
gation. Generally, plaintiffs' attorneys take such cases on a contingent fee
basis, but attorneys' increased reluctance or inability to absorb the risks that
the fee arrangement presents; namely, the failure to recover attorneys' fees,
has presented plaintiffs with insurmountable obstacles. The requirements
for enhancing attorneys' fees to reflect the fact that Title VII cases are taken
120. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982).
121. Private attorneys handled the following major cases: Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); and Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
122. See N. AMAKER, supra note 82, at 110. Amaker notes that:
The number of cases EEOC has taken to court has declined visibly from the Carter
years .... The sharpest decline initially was in the so-called systemic or pattern-or-
practice cases, which fell from 62 in fiscal 1980 to 0 in fiscal 1982 and then increased
to 10 in fiscal 1983.
Id.
123. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT REQUIREMENTS 17-18 (1987).
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on contingency are very stringent. 24  Moreover, even when a plaintiff
prevails, protracted litigation delays an often inadequate fee. A court may
deny attorney's fees if the plaintiff's judgment is not more favorable than the
pre-trial settlement proffered by the defendant. 1 25 A court may approve a
settlement in which the plaintiff receives full relief in damages, but the de-
fendant simultaneously demands denial of payment of the plaintiff's attor-
ney's fees. 12 6 Each policy may have an arguably reasonable goal. 127 The net
effect in both cases, however, is that the plaintiff's attorney may receive no
compensation even when the plaintiff prevails, whereas the defendant's at-
torney is fully compensated even when the defendant loses. Also, in both
instances, the plaintiff's attorney faces the potentially uneasy position of
having concern for his fee compete with his client's interests. Either the
attorney is pushed towards urging acceptance of a less than adequate settle-
ment or contracts for a portion of the plaintiff's recovery to cover a fee,
thereby creating the impression on the part of the plaintiff that his attorney,
not the defendant or the court, rendered him less than "whole."' 28 Legisla-
tion could relieve the plaintiff's attorney of these unfair pressures on recov-
ery of an attorney's fee.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit formed a task
force that reported: "Fee awards for recent years in the social action context
have been so discouraging that few attorneys will accept a civil rights
case.' 129 Employers' attempts to push plaintiff's attorney's fees down to the
lowest possible levels have resulted in an enormous amount of litigation sur-
124. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711,
727-31 (1987). Multipliers or other enhancements of a reasonable lodestar fee to compensate
plaintiff's attorney for assuming the risk of loss is impermissible under the usual fee-shifting
statutes. Even if the typical fee-shifting statute is construed to permit enhancement of the
lodestar for risk assumption, there should be evidence in the record and a finding by the trial
court that without risk enhancement plaintiff would have encountered "substantial difficulties
in finding counsel in the local or other relevant market." Id. at 731.
125. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1985) (U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
126. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734-38 (1986).
127. The goal is obviously to discourage needless litigation where the plaintiff cannot se-
cure greater relief through a trial. Marek, 473 U.S. at 10-11. Also, it may not be totally
unreasonable for a defendant to bargain for a certain sum, setting a bottom line in terms of
financial exposure. Evans, 475 U.S. at 734-38.
128. See Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (a criticism that increased
pressures for pretrial settlement may merely reflect the superior strength of the employer); see
also Note, Evans v. Jeff D.: Putting the Squeeze on Private Attorneys General 9 GEO. MASON
U.L. REV. 389 (1987) (criticizing the Court on the ground that its interpretation will discour-
age attorneys from representing civil rights plaintiffs).
129. Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 249 (3d Cir.
1985) (footnote omitted).
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rounding the question of plaintiff's attorney's fees.' 3 ° Plaintiff's counsel
have had to resist, albeit successfully, claims that nonprofit public interest
law firms should receive no fee because they regularly handle cases without
charging the clients or that they should be compensated on a lower level
than private practitioners.' 3 ' Defendants have unsuccessfully claimed that a
plaintiff should recover no attorney's fees if a defendant prevailed on a "sig-
nificant issue," or if the court determined it was not the "central issue" in
the case. 13 2 Such efforts are perhaps understandable from the defendants'
point of view, although the fees some employers expended on their own
counsel in such efforts must have equaled or surpassed the amounts origi-
nally in dispute. As the litigation becomes less cost-effective for a given de-
fendant, it must have an ideological thrust of disabling Title VII litigation in
the future. Even more startling is the initial approval these efforts have re-
ceived from the ostensibly neutral agents-the federal district courts.
Fortunately, courts of appeal and the United States Supreme Court have
reversed some of the more restrictive rulings.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has sometimes been unresponsive to
plaintiff's claims for attorney's fees. The Court has denied plaintiff's attor-
ney compensation for an optional state administrative proceeding that pre-
ceded an ultimately successful suit brought under the nineteenth century
Civil Rights Act in the federal court. 134 The Court has also denied plain-
tiff's recovery of attorney's fees against an intervenor even though plaintiff
was the "prevailing party" and the plaintiff's attorney expended additional
efforts in answering claims that the intervenor unsuccessfully asserted.
131
The employers' counsel, however, are fully compensated on a continuing
basis in all of the above circumstances, and the defendants' attorneys run no
130. See Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978); see also supra notes
124-26 and accompanying text. To stem the tide of litigation around attorney's fees, the Court
favors standards that are clear and easily applied because, as the Court stated in Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983), "[a] request for attorney's fees should not result in a
second major litigation."
131. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892-93 (1984).
132. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 1486, 1492-93
(1989).
133. See generally Kimble, Attorney's Fees In Civil Rights Cases. An Essay on Streamlining
the Formulation to Attract General Practitioners, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 373 (1985-86) (discussing
restrictions lower courts have placed on the award of a plaintiff's attorney's fees).
134. Webb v. Board of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 244 (1985). But cf New York Gaslight Club,
Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 67-71 (1980) (holding that plaintiff's counsel can be compensated
for handling state administrative proceedings prior to a suit under Title VII in federal court
because such proceedings are contemplated under that Act).
135. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732, 2736-39 (1989).
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risk of noncompensation because they are not forced to take cases on a con-
tingent fee basis.
The law here is not fully developed because fee-shifting is unusual in
American civil litigation, thus resulting in judicial caution in awarding coun-
sel's fees. However, discouraging attorneys from taking plaintiffs' cases ex-
presses, in the most effective way possible, hostility toward the goals of
employment discrimination legislation. Congress should end this indirect
hostility by adopting legislation establishing attorney's fees at a set level and
giving the courts additional guidance in awarding them. These levels and
guidelines should encourage a sufficient number of attorneys and firms to
represent victims of employment discrimination.
The goal of such legislation should be to move plaintiff's counsel toward
the position of defendant's counsel. Perhaps bar associations or the EEOC
could canvass the fee structure of the area's largest firms, which handled tort
cases on a contingent fee basis, and the courts could set plaintiff's counsel's
fees using the hourly fee practices that have allowed those firms to function
profitably. Alternatively, plaintiff's counsel in a given case could elect com-
pensation equal to defendant's counsel's hourly rate.
Plaintiffs' attorneys complain that even when the fee is ultimately deemed
adequate, it is obtained at the end of litigation, which may have lasted three
or more years. Plaintiffs, unlike defendants, usually cannot advance an in-
terim fee to their counsel to compensate for the extensive amount of time
sometimes necessary to develop fully an employment discrimination case.
Plaintiff's limited resources invite time-consuming, dilatory tactics on the
part of defense counsel (who can usually bill his client on an ongoing regular
basis), which exhaust the opposition and force surrefider or an unfavorable
compromise. 36 One means of equalizing these disparities would be legisla-
tion establishing a loan fund, administered by the EEOC, upon which attor-
neys could draw in the early stages of litigation. Plaintiffs' counsel could
replenish the fund at the conclusion of the case upon award of attorney's
fees. 137
136. Professor Blumrosen suggests that an administrative hearing officer should possess the
power to limit discovery to foster the expedition of a case. See Blumrosen, Expanding the
Concept of Affirmative Action to Address Contemporary Conditions, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 297 (1984-85). One wonders how this would work in practice. Except for the most
clearly irrelevant requests, how can a hearing officer determine that a litigant should not have
some information, which is, at least arguably, pertinent to a claim or defense? Moreover, the
courts now have authority to regulate the scope of discovery, but it has not operated as an
effective restraint on protracted litigation.
137. Such a fund would approximate, for the plaintiff's counsel, the conditions under
which defense counsel operates. Therefore, the EEOC should, in its discretion, forgive loans
contracted in cases that the plaintiff lost, so long as a reasonable basis for the suit from the
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2. Access to Interpretive Economic Data
All of the above suggestions assume that active, pervasive discrimination
in employment continues and that additional resources and procedural re-
forms would enhance prospective plaintiffs' ability to mount large-scale
cases. Macroeconomic data tends to show a continuing wide disparity be-
tween the incomes of white males as compared to women and minorities,
who have been traditionally subjected to discrimination.138 Neutral factors
like differential education, training, or work experience do not fully explain
the continuing disparity, thus raising a suspicion that arbitrary, discrimina-
tory factors play a role.' 39 However, the picture is now much more complex
and fraught with analytical difficulties than in 1964 when Title VII was
passed.
Commentators point to a number of structural changes in the American
economy, unrelated to overt discrimination, which may operate functionally
as barriers to substantial improvement of the economic status of women and
minorities. Analysts say that America is rapidly moving towards an increas-
ing polarization between low and high income groups with a shrinking mid-
dle class.' 4 ° However, they advance myriad and sometimes contradictory
explanations for this disturbing phenomenon. Indicators suggest that job
growth will occur at either end of the spectrum-with professional, high-
tech and high-skilled positions, and conversely, a vast number of low-skilled,
low-paid service jobs.' 4 ' Some say American companies have had to retreat
from the manufacturing sector because of increased competition from for-
eign countries."4 2 Others say American companies transfer jobs abroad to
take advantage of lower labor costs and less stringent regulation in third
world countries.' 43 Some speculate that the growth of lower-skilled jobs in
attorney's perspective existed at the outset. In effect, this fund would place private attorneys
on a similar plane with staff counsel at the EEOC, who receive salaries regardless of the out-
come of the case, and the agency has to reimburse defendants only where the suit is frivolous.
138. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT
AMONG BLACKS, HISPANICS AND WOMEN 55-56 (1982); COMMISSION ON OCCUPATIONAL
CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS, ASSEMBLY OF BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF
EQUAL VALUE (D. Treiman & H. Hartmann eds. 1981).
139. See sources cited supra note 138.
140. RETHINKING EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 119, at 23-25.
141. See Jeffries & McGahey, Equity, Growth and Socioeconomic Change: Anti-Discrimina-
tion Policy in an Era of Economic Transformation, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 233,
248-50 (1984-85).
142. See Thurow, The Disappearance of the Middle Class, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1984, at F3,
col. 1.
143. See Squires, Response: Private Investment as an Equity Issue, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 283 (1984-85).
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the suburbs and the decline of such jobs in the inner cities, where the bulk of
the minority population lives, causes, in part, the plight of minorities."'
Some suggest that the plight of women is based on their choosing (or being
channelled into) female-dominated jobs, which subsequently creates an
"overcrowding" resulting in depressed wages.' 4 5 Others dispute a number
of these hypotheses. Regarding women's depressed wages, for example, the
female-dominated nursing profession is recently experiencing severe labor
shortages, but the shortages have not prompted an escalation of wages.' 46 A
Civil Rights Commission Report finds that suburbanization of jobs did not
fully explain the disparity in income between blacks and whites, for the dis-
parities remained constant upon comparison of the incomes of blacks and
whites who worked in the same suburbs.
147
In order to effectively shape an employment litigation program for the
plaintiffs, attorneys and plaintiffs' supporters must have access to economists
and other experts to help weigh and evaluate various studies which may
bolster or undermine the agenda. In the early days of litigation, public inter-
est advocates pursued the very visible, open practitioners of racial and gen-
der exclusion. Even the EEOC did not have a very carefully developed and
sophisticated program, guided by developing economic trends, for targeting
employers. Today, where discriminatory practices are less overt, sophisti-
cated analysis of economic data may be required to account for continuing
income disparities and lack of vertical mobility. Foundations that support
anti-discrimination litigation should build into their grants to public advo-
cates a component for non-legal expertise for long-range planning.
D. The Role of Private Advocacy Groups.: Reviving the Economic Boycott
One of the unfortunate side effects of the passage of civil rights legislation
has been the displacement of social action generated by lay persons. The
remedial focus of a comprehensive statutory scheme lulls the lay public, as
well as civil rights lawyers, into believing that active litigation is the only
response necessary to eradicate discrimination. Indeed, sophisticated em-
ployers may ultimately welcome putting the problem in a legal-administra-
tive framework when they learn that their superior resources in that terrain
may dilute and blunt the social protest. If delay, cost, and inadequate attor-
ney's fees subvert class actions under Title VII, civil rights organizations
would be well advised to reinvigorate the economic boycott against compa-
144. See W. WILSON, supra note 61, at 7-8, 42.
145. See Jeffries & McGahey, supra note 141, at 273.
146. See Clauss, Colloquium: Employment Discrimination in the 1980's, 13 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 225, 229 (1984-85) (Keynote Address).
147. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 123, at 56.
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nies that continue to show employment patterns of segregation or exclusion
of minorities and women from better paying jobs. Detecting which enter-
prises engage in these practices can be problematic. It is not accidental that
companies with federal contracts employ a higher proportion of minorities
and women than companies that do not have such contracts. 148 The poten-
tial for losing a federal contract under the executive order program must
exert some pressure on these companies to change their prior employment
patterns. Civil rights organizations should not be forced to rely on individ-
ual complaints to identify the companies to be boycotted because the EEOC
regularly receives bi-annual reports from companies nationwide on their em-
ployment of women and minorities. Under current Title VII law, this infor-
mation is not available to the general public, and only a person who has filed
a charge with the EEOC may request and receive notice of a right to sue."'
Congress should amend the statute to permit any person access to such data
as a matter of public interest. Because the data are submitted to a public
agency, a claim of confidentiality is not a substantial argument against
disclosure.
Under the NLRA, employers have a duty to supply data pertinent to the
collective bargaining process.' 50 Unions could possibly demand employ-
ment information based on that duty. A union could bargain for an end to
discriminatory employment practices, and thus demand information that
reveals past discriminatory practices. Indeed, unions arguably have an obli-
gation to eradicate such practices under the duty of fair representation, at
least where there is some colorable claim that employers discriminated
against current employees. Unions and civil rights organizations need to
work closely because they share many of the same goals now that the senior-
ity question has faded from importance.' This would be one concrete way
for unions to demonstrate a good faith desire for such coalition by joining
with civil rights organizations. The fact that unions, however, represented
148. CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO OPEN THE DOORS
OF JOB OPPORTUNITY 123-24 (1984). The Office of Federal Contract Compliance at the U.S.
Department of Labor conducted a study in 1983 of 77,000 companies with over 20 million
employees. The study found that female employment had increased by 15.2% and minority
employment by 20.1% between 1974 and 1980 for federal contractors, with only a total em-
ployment growth of 3%. Id. By contrast, minority employment increased only 12.3% and
female employment by 2.2% at non-contracting companies over the same period, despite the
fact that these companies had a larger growth in total employment of 8.2%. Id. at 124.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1982); see also EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449
U.S. 590, 598 (1981).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982); see also NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-
36 (1967) (NLRA requires employer to furnish information to the union).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
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only 20% of the workforce in 1980,152 demonstrates the need for legislation
that requires the bulk of employers to give the public the needed informa-
tion. Pending an amendment, civil rights organizations should initially tar-
get for boycott companies that refuse voluntary disclosure of the
information.
A boycott could serve a number of collateral goals. Where a particular
company's products or services make it feasible, a boycott accompanied by
picketing could capture "free" broadcast time and news attention. Or-
ganizers might enlist college and high school students for the picketing be-
cause those students have flexible schedules and do not face discharge for
participation. Organizers could ask minority, feminist, and public-spirited
organizations to supply lists of their memberships to a central civil rights
organization that could forward mailings about the targeted companies to
interested organizations and enlist the support of other organizations in an
economic boycott. This might have the positive side effect of harnessing the
energies of the growing minority middle class not currently engaged in social
action. Moreover, it enlists the support of these individuals in a cost-free
manner, posing no threat to pursuit of their careers. At most, interested
individuals' could urge their organizations (fraternities, sororities, profes-
sional minority organizations, etc.) to provide membership lists and financial
support to a civil rights organization that would take the lead in developing
the criteria and strategy for targeting companies. Boycotts have been uti-
lized in the past, but this Article suggests more focused, controlled, wide-
spread, and sustained action. Such an effort would definitely need lawyers
because picketing and boycotting would have to be kept within legal bounda-
ries to prevent (or defend against) any counter-offensives, such as those
which occurred around the NAACP civil rights boycotts in Mississippi.153
Controls should be integrated to deter charges of corruption and protect
the integrity of the boycott effort. Officials of the civil rights organization
might, for example, commit themselves to refrain from taking contributions,
employment, or any indirect benefits from a company until three years after
the end of a boycott. A formal charter of the controls on the organization
leading the boycotts, drafted by lawyers with expertise in ethical problems,
152. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1771 (1983).
153. Merchants in Mississippi sued the NAACP, charging that the organization had vio-
lated the state's antitrust law when it conducted an economic boycott of business establish-
ments to protest racial discrimination. The litigation lasted ten years before the Supreme
Court found that the application of the antitrust laws, under the facts in the case, would vio-
late the first amendment. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982). The
complexity and length of this litigation, however, shows the need for careful legal advice. See
The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 62, 171-75 (1982).
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could be made available to the media and participating organizations. A
means of monitoring a targeted company's compliance with equal employ-
ment opportunity requirements, which was not always done in past boycotts,
would be an absolute necessity.
The boycott tactic could, for various reasons, reach a number of situations
untouched by litigation. The boards of major corporations, faculties and
trusteeships of major universities, and staffs of major think tanks, for exam-
ple, do not yet reflect a fair proportion of minorities and women. With re-
spect to universities and think tanks, the boycott should focus on the major
benefactor corporation. "Employment" under Title VII, however, may not
include corporate directorships. Moreover, with regard to high level posi-
tions, the courts have taken a stance of deferring to the employer's judgment
when filling a post which calls for a high degree of subjective evaluation.' 54
An organization conducting a boycott need not meet a formal standard of
"proof" acceptable to a court. It can simply make a commonsense demand
that employers exercise reasonable efforts to correct the absence of minori-
ties and women.
III. IMMIGRATION
Hispanics,'55 the second largest minority group in the country, comprise
the largest group of recent immigrants (lawful and unlawful) to this coun-
try.' If present trends continue, they will equal or exceed the African-
American population in the country by the 1990's.
157
With the exception of immigrants from Cuba, Hispanics generally have an
economic profile analogous to African-Americans; as a group, Hispanics suf-
fer high unemployment and significantly lower income in comparison to
whites who are not recent immigrants.15 8 The group, however, faces some
154. See, e.g., Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 581 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1978); Frausto v.
Legal Aid Soc'y, 563 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Bartholet, Application of Title VII to
Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945, 976-78 (1984).
155. "Hispanics" as used here encompasses recent immigrants, and their children, from
Puerto Rico, Mexico, Cuba, or other South and Central American countries or persons from
Spanish-speaking countries who married native American Indians (Chicanos).
156. 83.1% of Americans are white, 11.7% are black, and persons of Spanish origin are the
next largest minority group at 6.4%. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980
CENSUS OF POPULATION - GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 12 (1983). Mendes,
Profiting From a Changing America, FORTUNE, Oct. 2, 1988, at 45; Bonafede, Voter Turnout
- How Many and Which Ones - Could Decide Presidential Race, 16 NAT'L J. 404, 409 (Mar.
3, 1984).
157. G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 124 (1981); Baker, In Tomorrow's America, Se
Habla Espanol; Hispanic USA.: Breaking the Melting Pot, Bus. WK., May 23, 1988, at 18.
158. Newman, A Profile of Hispanics in the United States Workforce, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Dec. 1978, at 3.
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unique employment problems because of illegal residence or, for some lawful
residents, lack of citizenship. The United States Supreme Court has upheld
state legislation barring aliens from service in any governmental position
that entails the formulation, implementation, or interpretation of public pol-
icy on the grounds that citizenship is a "rational" minimal test of sufficient
allegiance and loyalty to the country and the state.'" 9 An executive order
also bars aliens, with some limited congressional exceptions, from employ-
ment with the Federal Government in the competitive service. 160 This citi-
zenship barrier is particularly unfortunate because public employment has
always been a refuge of minorities from high levels of discrimination in the
private sector. Advocates should continue constitutional challenges to the
citizenship limitation on public service because of its arbitrary nature. Very
close votes in some cases reflect the high degree of controversy in Supreme
Court decisions on this issue and indicate fair prospects for success. 16,
Some immigrants may secure access to public employment if they can
qualify for citizenship as a result of the amnesty provisions of the new Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). 162  Many immigrants,
however, have had difficulty availing themselves of the right to permanent
residency offered under the law. The statute required persons to prove that
they had unlawfully resided continuously in the United States since January
1, 1982.163 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) reportedly
imposed stringent proof of residency requirements in some areas, and be-
cause employers of aliens often violate a number of labor laws (e.g. mini-
mum wage, unemployment tax), they may not have been inclined to
cooperate in supplying documentation. 164 The difficulties some immigrants
159. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 444-47 (1982) (probation officers); Ambach
v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979) (public school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S.
291, 297-300 (1978) (state troopers). But cf In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722-27 (1973) (state
may not bar a resident alien from taking a state bar examination).
160. Exec. Order No. 11,935, 3 C.F.R. 146 (1976), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 3301 app. at 521
(1982). The order has been upheld against constitutional challenges in Mow Sun Wong v.
Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
161. For example, Ambach, 441 U.S. at 69, was decided by a five to four vote.
162. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified in scattered titles and sections).
163. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
164. Senator John H. Chafee recently commented that immigration deportation policy dif-
fers from one region to another and that "the result of this lack of coherent national policy has
been that immigrants in some areas are treated leniently while in other areas they are treated
quite harshly." Dewar, Senate Votes Protection for Aliens' Kin, Wash. Post, July 13, 1989, at
A4, col. 1. A number of studies have shown that a large portion of employers breach child
labor laws, overtime payment requirements, and health codes when employing aliens. See
Waldinger, The Occupational and Economic Integration of the New Immigrants, 45 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 210 (1982). In Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700 (1 1th Cir.
1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the United States
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have faced in obtaining permanent residency reveals a need for a statutory
amendment giving a new period for registration under the new rules for per-
manent residency.
The IRCA imposes sanctions against employers who employ persons who
illegally reside in the country. 1 65 During the debate prior to the IRCA's
passage, some speculated that this provision might generate discrimination
against all persons bearing any indicia of being Hispanic. 166 Practitioners in
the field do not report much evidence of this form of discrimination since the
passage of the Act. 16 7 However, employers reportedly have been discharg-
ing persons who cannot document their rightful presence in the country. 168
The reports also suggest that while some of the discharged persons do leave
the country, many attempt to remain despite the loss of work.'6 9 It is diffi-
cult to imagine how such persons will sustain themselves, particularly be-
cause the intensification of poverty in the Hispanic community in recent
years compromises the traditional reliance on relatives and friends as a
meaningful alternative while pursuing other work. 170
The severe hardship of family breakup may also be an indirect result of
the new immigration legislation. Indeed, some immigrants who qualified for
District Court for the District of Alabama's holding that an employer is not obligated to ob-
serve the minimum wage laws when employing undocumented workers. The circuit court thus
removed one incentive for employers not to cooperate when aliens seek documentation to be-
come citizens. See also Comment, Protection for Undocumented Workers Under the FLSA: An
Evaluation in Light ofJRCA, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 379, 395-96 (1988) (discussing the re-
versed district court opinion).
165. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (Supp. V. 1987).
166. See H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 49, 90, 216, reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5653, 5694, 5752; Comment, IRCA's Antidis-
crimination Provisions: Protections Against Hiring Discrimination in Private Employment, 25
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 405, 405-06 (1988).
167. The author has received informal reports to this effect from some civil rights practi-
tioners. The matter, however, will be documented by the U.S. Comptroller General. The
Comptroller must prepare an annual report through 1990 that examines whether the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) has produced a pattern of discrimination on the
basis of national origin. If the Comptroller reports that such a pattern exists and Congress
agrees by passing a joint resolution, the employer sanctions under the IRCA will terminate
within 30 days. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (Supp. V 1987).
168. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Pasadena Indep. School Dist., 662 F.
Supp. 443 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (employer fired four undocumented aliens when he discovered that
they had used false social security numbers to secure employment); see also Developments in
the Law - Immigration Policy and the Rights ofAliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1458 (1983).
169. See Wilkerson, 2 Decades of Decline Chronicled by Kerner Follow-up Report, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 1, 1988, at A12, col. 2.
170. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of Hispanic poor rose by 73%, from 500,000 to
900,000. The Hispanic community experienced setback at an even faster rate than the black
community in this aspect, for black poverty rose by only 24%, from 1.4 million to 1.8 million.
Wilkerson, supra note 169.
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permanent residence under the 1986 Act may have refused to register be-
cause they were afraid of triggering the deportation of other family members
who did not qualify. This type of family disruption may subject the new
immigration legislation to an attack on constitutional grounds. The issue
exists not only for those persons in a family who cannot convert from un-
documented status to lawful residence, but also for the relatives of perma-
nent residents who presently reside outside the country.
United States immigration laws limit total immigration to 270,000 annu-
ally, with no more than 20,000 from any specific nation.' 7 ' Immediate fam-
ily members of citizens (spouse and minor children) are exempt from these
numerical and national limits, but immediate family members of permanent
resident aliens are bound by the restrictions.172 Therefore, a permanent resi-
dent alien, particularly one from a nation with a high immigration rate to
the United States, must wait an estimated eight years before his family can
join him. This forced separation and consequent family disruption could
form the basis for a constitutional challenge.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the right of persons
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to have control
over family decisions, uninterrupted by governmental intrusion. In Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, the Court registered its strongest support for a claim
based on family unification. 173 In Moore, the Court held unconstitutional an
ordinance that restricted occupancy of single family dwellings to the imme-
diate nuclear family, thereby prohibiting a grandmother from living with her
two grandsons. 17 Justice Powell, writing for a plurality of the Court, noted
that when government undertakes "intrusive regulation of the family, ...
the usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate."' 175 Justice
Powell then carefully examined the importance of the governmental interest
asserted and the extent to which it was served by the challenged regulation
and concluded that the city's interests in avoiding overcrowding, excessive
traffic congestion, and excessive burdening of East Cleveland's public school
system were only tenuously related to the ordinance's limitation of occu-
pancy of a single family dwelling unit to the immediate family.'7 6 Notably,
the Court found the substantive due process liberty interest to extend beyond
the immediate nuclear family, recognizing the sanctity of the family as a
deeply-rooted tradition, and noting that "[e]specially in times of adversity,
171. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1152 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
172. Id. §§ 1151(a)-(b), 1101(a)(27) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
173. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
174. Id. at 506.
175. Id. at 499.
176. Id. at 499-500.
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such as ... economic need, the broader family has tended to come together
for mutual sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life."' 77
This latter point has particular relevance for the circumstances of most re-
cent immigrant Hispanic families and accurately conveys the importance of
the unity of such families. If an alien claimed a constitutional right to have
immediate family members in the United States, the government could re-
spond that it does not prevent unification of the family because the alien
could leave the United States to rejoin his relatives. However, in Moore, the
Court implicitly refused to sustain the argument that the grandmother and
grandchildren could move to a town where the zoning accommodated their
families, thus achieving family unification.17
The primary impediment to recognition of such a due process liberty in-
terest in normal family life on behalf of an alien results from the extreme
judicial deference given to Congress in matters governing immigration. 7 9
The courts only reluctantly enter an arena that may potentially impact on
foreign relations. The cases treating these claims, however, do not display
the quality of careful consideration. Moreover, the more recent case of Plyer
v. Doe, 180 which invalidated legislation that would have barred undocu-
mented alien children from public schools, may signal a readiness by the
Court to assay the social impact of the immigration laws on the constitu-
tional rights of aliens. '
IV. VOTING RIGHTS
A. The Voting Rights Act of 1965
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 182 a legislative reform that dominated the
agenda of the civil rights movement in the late 1950's and early 1960's, con-
tains two major provisions-it prohibits election devices and techniques used
to disenfranchise blacks and other minorities (e.g. literacy tests), and it re-
quires some jurisdictions to seek clearance of new election procedures from
the Justice Department to prevent resort to any new covert forms of discrim-
177. Id. at 505.
178. Id. at 500 (by implication) and 550 (White, J., dissenting).
179. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). Fortunately, at this writing, the Senate
had voted to grant a stay of deportation and to authorize work for spouses and minor children
of legalized aliens, if they were in the United States when the Immigration Reform Act was
passed on November 6, 1986. See Dewar, supra note 164.
180. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
181. Id. at 241. For a full development of the constitutional arguments, see Guendel-
sberger, Implementing Family Unification Rights in American Immigration Law: Proposed
Amendments, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 253 (1988).
182. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
197 3-197 3p (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
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ination. 18 3 A dramatic increase in the number of registered minority voters
has led to phenomenal growth in minorities occupying public office. 184 An
enlarged minority electorate enhances the possibilities for achieving the leg-
islative reforms called for in this Article in education and employment.
Minority plaintiffs also rely on the fourteenth amendment to invalidate
election systems such as at-large elections in which all candidates compete
against each other instead of in smaller single-member district elections. At-
large elections dilute the strength of minority voting blocks. In City of Mo-
bile v. Bolden, 185 however, the United States Supreme Court held that plain-
tiffs bear the heavy burden of proving under the fourteenth amendment and
the Voting Rights Act that the challenged electoral system was adopted with
the intention of diluting or neutralizing the minority vote.' 86 In 1982, Con-
gress amended the Voting Rights Act to permit proof of a history of racial
voting patterns which operated to exclude minority candidates from election
as a basis for invalidating an election system.187 This amendment establishes
a "results" test as opposed to the Bolden "intent to discriminate" test. In
Thornburg v. Gingles, 88 the United States Supreme Court sustained the
amendment and allowed racial polarization as primary proof that a particu-
lar electoral system prevented minorities from occupying public office.' 89
New areas ripe for challenge exist, and the courts will have to determine
whether the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act will support these
challenges. Plaintiffs recently attacked election procedures in single-member
districts, claiming that run-off systems are unlawful, advocating the adoption
of cumulative voting, or claiming that legislative reapportionment plans
have failed to preserve intact concentrations of black voters.' 9 ' Defendants
will meet these challenges by relying on a portion of the 1982 amendments
that specifically disclaims a per se absolute right on the part of minorities to
183. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973a(b)-(c), 1973c (1982).
184. See Note, Eradicating Racial Discrimination in Voter Registration: Rights and Reme-
dies Under the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 97 (1983).
185. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
186. Id. at 66-67.
187. Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131 (1982) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)).
188. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
189. Id. at 54-61.
190. On the latter issue, see City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987)
(holding that an annexation of an all white area to an all white city constituted a "change" in
voting practice and procedure that had to be cleared by the Justice Department). The United
States Supreme Court sustained an injunction against the annexation based on the District
Court's finding that the city had not satisfactorily explained its move where there was a history
of racial discrimination and the city had refused to annex a nearby predominantly black neigh-
borhood. Id. at 464.
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election results equal to their proportion in the population.' 91 Commenta-
tors also argue that drawing all minority voters into small enclaves presents
a danger to minority interests because minority voters will lose the capacity
to influence elections in white-dominated areas and, therefore, will have less
incentive to exercise the vote in high proportions in elections affecting only
their districts. 92 Voter dilution claims may possibly be extended to other
elections besides those in which legislative representatives are chosen, such
as judicial or school board elections.
B. Beyond the Voting Rights Act: Removing Impediments
to Participatory Democracy
Testing the limits of the Voting Rights Act, a very sound strategy, has
possibly produced the maximum benefits that the strategy offers. Therefore,
activists need to formulate a larger agenda. Many of the changes that will
improve the condition of minorities, especially the poor, require litigation
that addresses issues other than discrimination. Whether the status quo re-
garding the electoral system has features which impede the participation of
low-income persons (regardless of race or ethnic background) or which im-
pede the assertion of new and progressive ways of organizing society that
may provide more security and opportunities for disadvantaged persons is a
worthy line of inquiry.
Participation in American elections, in comparison to our western Euro-
pean counterparts, is shockingly low, and has declined steadily for a number
of years.' 93 Some general features of our electoral system, most notably re-
gistration, deter voting, and groups whose interests are adversely affected
should challenge those features in litigation. Registration practices vary
widely from state to state: one state requires no registration, 194 some states
provide for registration by mail,' 95 some states permit registration on the
day of election, 196 others close registration one month prior to an election; 197
one state requires registration in a municipality and in the county where the
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982) ("[p]rovided, [t]hat nothing in this section establishes a
right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population").
192. See, e.g., A. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT-AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MI-
NORITY VOTING RIGHTS 233-41 (1987).
193. See generally F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE 5 (1988);
Burnham, The Appearance and Disappearance of the American Voter, in ELECTORAL PARTICI-
PATION 35, 37-44 (R. Rose ed. 1980).
194. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-02 (1981).
195. ALASKA STAT. § 15.07.050 (1976); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 303 (West 1977).
196. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 122(4) (Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 201.061(3) (West Supp. 1989).
197. ALASKA STAT. § 15.07.070(d) (1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1311(g) (1987).
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municipality is located;' 98 and others grant local registrars wide latitude in
choosing hours and places of registration so that practices vary within a
state.' 99 Although the prevention of voter fraud ostensibly justifies the regis-
tration process, evidence indicates that states with the least restrictive prac-
tices do not report higher incidences of fraud, have often lowered their
election costs, and, more importantly, show a higher voter participation.2 '
The long history of the use of voter registration as a means of thwarting
electoral participation by blacks and newly-arrived immigrants should serve
as a constant reminder of potential abuse. The Voting Rights Act attempts,
in part, to address that history. The poor today, however, remain dispropor-
tionately unregistered in comparison to other class elements in society.2"'
This is not simply a product of their apathy or disinterest, but reflects the
manner in which state officials have structured and administered voter
registration.20 2
Moreover, registration centers often change or are poorly advertised, and
when organizations try to secure regular registration centers at places that
the poor frequent, such as welfare, food stamps, and unemployment centers,
they have met concerted resistance and harassment from state officials.2" 3
For example, as Congress considered adoption of the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964, mayors from around the country, both Democratic and Repub-
lican, lobbied Congress to prohibit voter registration explicitly in antipoverty
agencies." ° The time may have arrived to challenge registration per se as an
unconditional restriction on the right to vote.20 5 Although the Supreme
Court has treated the registration process as a matter for individual state's
discretion, the same conditions proved no obstacle to the Court's constitu-
tional intervention in the "political" controversy surrounding the one-man,
198. MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-35 (Supp. 1988). But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 98.041 (West
1982) (prohibiting dual registration).
199. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:133 (West 1979) (discretion to choose places of
registration); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-2(a), (c) (1986) (discretion to choose hours).
200. Kerstein, Unlocking the Doors to Democracy. Election Process Reform, 15 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 687, 695-709 (1987).
201. P. KIMBALL, THE DISCONNECTED 16 (1972) ("Voter Participation has always exhib-
ited a high correlation with education and income.").
202. See, e.g., R. WOLFINGER & S. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 61-65 (1980) (discussing
various techniques used to limit voting through registration requirements).
203. F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 193, at 178-79, 192-200.
204. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964: Hearings on H.R. 10440 Before the Subcomm. on
the War on Poverty Program of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. iii-iv
(1964).
205. See generally Note, Voter Registration: A Restriction on the Fundamental Right to
Vote, 96 YALE L.J. 1615 (1987) (challenging voter registration as a per se restriction of the
right to vote).
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one-vote issue in Baker v. Carr.206 Furthermore, incumbent politicians of
either party have no incentive to change the status quo. Unregistered per-
sons have no influence over these officials who loath expanding the electorate
for fear that they could introduce a quantum of new voters their next oppo-
nent could recruit.
Other election practices, such as the unnecessary purging of voters from
registration rolls and refusal to expand election hours to non-work periods,
should face attack as undue restrictions on the right to vote. Some states
silence the electoral, political voice of persons who have been convicted of a
crime.20 7 These states justify curtailing some constitutional rights of prison-
ers as necessary and natural incidents to incarceration, but barring voting
during and after imprisonment hardly seems to serve any necessity. In gen-
eral, incarceration should serve the state's needs for security, rehabilitation,
and deterrence.2"8 Indeed, denial of the right to vote seems to disserve the
goal of rehabilitation and deterrence of prisoner unrest because it undercuts
prisoners' ability to petition elected officials, as a constituency, about inhu-
mane conditions in the prison.
The Supreme Court, however, refused to validate an equal protection at-
tack on the use of criminal convictions as a bar to voting in Richardson v.
Ramirez.2 09 The Court held that because section 2 of the fourteenth amend-
ment structured a reduction of representation for seceding states that denied
blacks the right to vote for reasons other than participation in a crime, then
the framers of the amendment must have assumed that loss of the right to
vote upon conviction did not amount to a per se denial of equal protection
under section 1 of the amendment. 210 However, Ramirez does not exhaust
the possibilities of attack on this practice. Where the disqualification is ex-
pressed in general terms (e.g. "crimes of moral turpitude") a variance in
206. 369 U.S. 186, 232 (1962).
207. See ALA. CONST. art, VIII, § 182; ARIZ. CONST. art. 7, § 2; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2;
FLA. CONST. art. 6, § 4; IOWA CONST. art. 2, § 5; Ky. CONST. § 145; MD. CONST. art. I, § 4;
MIss. CONST. art. 12, § 241; N.M. CONST. art. VII, § I; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5; UTAH
CONST. art. IV, § 6; VA. CONST. art. II, § 7; WYo. CONST. art. 6, § 6; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-101.5 (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 1701 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.041 (West
1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-4(c) (1986); see also Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-
felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and "The Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300,
1300 n.1 (1989).
208. For example, one may argue that a state may bar persons convicted of a crime involv-
ing election fraud or abuse from voting as a deterrent to future improprieties. This rationale
would obviously not justify the exclusion of persons convicted for passing a bad check or
driving an auto recklessly, which disqualifies a person in some states. See, e.g., Miss. CONST.
art. 12, § 241 (forgery).
209. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
210. Id. at 54; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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application between counties may violate equal protection. The Court ex-
pressly declined to resolve this issue in Ramirez because the state court be-
low had not ruled on the claim."1' Moreover, enumerated felonies leave the
state without a "compelling state interest" in abridging the right to vote
when a state cannot show a basis for denying the right to vote upon convic-
tion for some crimes and not others, another claim not foreclosed by Rami-
rez. Furthermore, southern states, where approximately one-half of the
black population resides, retain a conviction as a bar to the vote.212 A state
that adopts criminal conviction as a disqualifier in order to disproportion-
ately disenfranchise blacks violates equal protection guarantees.21 3 The
equal protection provisions of a state constitution make the disability ex-
isting in a statute vulnerable to attack where the textual problems of section
2 of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution would not exist.
In this context, the claim should go beyond Ramirez to include persons pres-
ently incarcerated. The state court should, arguably, sensitize itself to the
equal protection claims of persons wholly dependent upon the state and
who, by definition, are excluded from the political process that they might
otherwise rely upon to address the issue.
Many citizens perceive a lack of fundamental difference between the two
major parties, and a sense that campaigns do not focus on vital issues, caus-
ing nonparticipation in the electoral process. The deliberate structure of
electoral systems often. makes the entrance of dissident candidates or third
parties into the electoral process exceedingly difficult.2z 4 Consequently, the
public remains uneducated about reforms, which may be critical to minori-
ties and significant portions of the white community alike, that neither of the
major parties willingly advances. The time has come to invalidate arbitrary
impediments to participation of new political parties through litigation. 15
Many commentators charge that contributors of large financial donations
have greatly compromised the autonomy of candidates and elected officials.
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has barred restrictions on
the amount of funds that corporations and wealthy individuals may expend
in elections on the grounds that such spending constitutes a form of
211. 418 U.S. at 56.
212. See, e.g., ALA. 4QONST. art. VIII, § 182; GA. CONST. art. 2, § 1, 3; MISS. CONST. art.
12, § 241; N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 2(3); VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:102
(West Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-55(2) (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-42 (1985);
see also Note, Disenfranchisement of Ex-felons: A Reassessment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 845 (1973)
(attacking disenfranchisement of felons as unconstitutional).
213. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231 (1985).
214. M. PARENTI, DEMOCRACY FOR THE FEW 172-95 (5th ed. 1988).
215. See Kerstein, supra note 200, at 695-709.
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"speech." '2 16 If the composition of the Supreme Court changes sufficiently,
the new Court should revisit this issue.
V. FAMILY ISSUES-POVERTY
Debate among scholars and lawyer-activists has increasingly focused on
the fear that civil rights law as traditionally defined and practiced is increas-
ingly remote from, or irrelevant to, the growing underclass of minorities who
grow ever more intensely mired in poverty. Moreover, scholars speculate
that the very success of civil rights laws, for African-Americans at least,
2 17
has created a sizeable middle class that increasingly distances itself from the
African-American poor in income, and consequently, in place of residence,
place and quality of schooling, social interaction and life experiences. 2 18 The
distancing phenomenon not only deprives the African-American ghettos of
the moderating influence of persons with middle-class aspirations, but re-
cruits many whites and middle-class African-Americans to the view that the
African-American underclass solely or primarily bears responsiblity for its
own deteriorating condition through a perverse refusal to adopt middle-class
values. 219 This sort of abandonment deprives the black ghetto not only of
constructive role models, but, more importantly, of local leadership.2 2 °
While the African-American poor may have provided many of the foot
soldiers for the early civil rights battles, the college-educated or middle-class
portion of the community provided black leadership. With a few notable
exceptions, such as the labor union movement or recent battles on behalf of
the homeless, the "invisibility" of the white poor may result from an absence
of leadership consistently and exclusively focusing public attention on their
problems. Robert Heilbroner, in fact, speculates that the primary problem
in obtaining public support for social welfare programs is the perception that
216. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976).
217. This Article limits itself to African-Americans because I have not seen fully docu-
mented developments of the same phenomena regarding Hispanics, Asian-Americans or Na-
tive Americans. The variables that might influence such development, such as common
religion or second language, immigrant status, and cultural norms, need extensive exploration
beyond the scope of this Article.
218. See W. WILSON, supra note 61, at 110; see also F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL (1977).
219. See T. SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 46-48 (1984) (arguments
that the plight of the black underclass results from their failure to achieve appropriate levels of
education and to adopt values of hard work and discipline). For careful development of this
point, see Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
220. See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 218, at 331-32.
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blacks exclusively or primarily benefit even though the white poor also
benefit. 2
21
A. Eradicating Poverty Through Constitutional Rights Litigation
Civil rights organizations, particularly those comprised of lawyers, must
now reconsider a shift of resources to revive and renew the 1960's initiative
to use legal strategies to fight poverty. The most recent research and writing
of the astute sociologist William J. Wilson reinforces the appropriateness of
this focus. 2 2 2 Wilson has developed an analysis convincingly arguing that
the class level of a portion of the minority community has become a heavier
determinant of their disadvantaged condition than racial discrimination.22 3
Jean and Edgar Cahn, writing in the early 1960's, gave birth to the then
revolutionary idea that the poor had a plethora of undiscovered, "rights"
under the law, and that rather than merely functioning as a passive, minimal
defense operation (as some claimed was the style of legal aid societies), law-
yers could go on the offensive and create new rights in major test case litiga-
tion to attack broad institutional practices. 224  Legal service programs
burgeoned and began operating in the Cahn mode. Indeed, a number of
startling breakthroughs in terms of new rights recognition resulted, and
often these rights, grounded in the Federal Constitution, received permanent
status. This approach to poverty reversal was criticized as inherently limited
because the constitutional decisions were often only process oriented, and
did not, indeed could not, generate the kind of redistribution of financial
resources toward the poor, which some commentators perceived as the
prime problem.2 25 Two hostile, federal administrations have greatly cur-
tailed the financial resources available to legal service corporations and their
221. Heilbroner, The Roots of Social Neglect in the United States, in Is LAW DEAD? 288,
296-301 (E. Rostow ed. 1971).
222. See W. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING
AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS (1978).
223. Id.
224. Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964).
225. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process forbids the state
from imposing a fee on an indigent to secure a divorce where the state monopolizes the means
for dissolving a marriage); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (the equal protection clause bars
a state from resorting to imprisonment when an indigent is incapable of paying a total fine
where there is a less intrusive alternative, payment in installments); Thorpe v. Housing Auth.,
386 U.S. 670 (1967) (tenant of federally assisted housing project is entitled to notice and op-
portunity to be heard prior to eviction). But cf Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 433 P.2d
697, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1967). Earl Johnson, a one-time head of the Office of Economic Op-
portunity (OEO) Legal Services notes that the Morris case saved $210 million for welfare re-
cipients. Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare. A Study in
the Uses and Limits of the Judicial Process, 58 MINN. L. REV. 211, 219 (1973).
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research centers, which generated the most creative litigation, making the
revival of such an approach more difficult than ever. 26 There remains, how-
ever, active scholarship and literature devoted to legal strategies to assist the
poor.
Poverty law litigation in the abstract, especially with a Federal constitu-
tional dimension, presents a very attractive route because it skirts the alter-
native of having to push for legislation aimed at addressing poverty during a
period of huge federal deficits. The poor now face somewhat the same posi-
tion as blacks when they sought relief from their condition through the Fed-
eral Constitution under Brown v. Board of Education. The poor, a minority
of the voting public in every state, have no financial resources to lobby, and
the general public views the poor with great ambivalence regarding the legit-
imacy of expending more resources on them.
The major problem with the suggested approach is the serious doubt re-
garding the receptiveness of the current Supreme Court to further mine
rights of the poor under the Constitution. The Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
movement has actively cautioned against continuing to pursue the definition
of a community's or a group's needs in terms of "rights." One scholar
claims that "civil rights" without a concomitant commitment to changing
the class structure, which functionally continues the subordination of blacks,
represent a formal and often empty "opportunity" for blacks in particu-
lar.227 Minority scholars make telling criticisms of this analysis, saying that
it largely understates the strategic value that the "rights" approach has had
and continues to have, for the black community in confronting the crudest
aspects of oppression. Moreover, the CLS scholars, to date, have remained
barren of proposed pragmatic alternative legal strategies. 228
Professor Charles Black recently argued that the Constitution still re-
mains a viable means of requiring the rectification of poverty. 9 Professor
Peter B. Edelman offers the most recent, comprehensive exploration of the
226. See Rosenblatt, Legal Entitlement and Welfare Benefits, in THE POLITICS OF LAW
262, 275 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) ("it has been possible for the Reagan administration and the
97th Congress to enact massive reductions in benefits and legal rights not only in AFDC and
Medicaid, but also in . . . Legal Services").
227. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
228. Crenshaw, supra note 219, at 1349-69; Haines, The Critical Legal Studies Movement
and Racism: Useful Analytics and Guides for Social Action or an Irrelevant Modern Legal
Skepticism and Solipsism, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 685 (1987). But see Hodgkiss, Petition-
ing and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569 (1987). Hodgkiss, however,
refutes this criticism and asserts that a number of critical scholars have suggested "legal theo-
ries and practices that can bring about change." Id. at 570 n.6.
229. Black, Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 1103 (1986).
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issue. Edelman has no illusion about the current Court and states frankly
that it would "surely not adopt the ideas advanced in [his] Essay."2 3 He
and others, however, have noted that extensive time for discussion, specula-
tion, and refinement of ideas around potentially emerging constitutional doc-
trine fosters their absorption and later adoption. 23' However, the more
delicate and critical questions are the appropriate forum and the content and
timing of litigation. Edelman has some suggestions on interim litigation
strategies, and others will be developed here.
Edelman's argument, in summary, centers on due process and equal pro-
tection. As to the former, he claims that the Constitution provides a right to
minimal income in subsistence terms, to secure the basics of food, shelter,
and medical care.2 32 The fact that the Constitution has no provision explic-
itly addressing poverty or that the "original intent" of the Framers of the
Constitution did not include addressing poverty does not defeat the claim
because both conditions have existed for other constitutional rights which
the Court has now firmly accepted.23 3 Moreover, some of the rights the
Court has recognized as "fundamental" or possessing some value that the
government cannot arbitrarily jeopardize, such as freedom of speech or the
right to political participation, are less critical than the right to survive or
cannot be exercised effectively under conditions of extreme poverty and dep-
rivation. The Court has not maintained a distinction between a state's inter-
ference and a state's failure to act affirmatively to protect a right when they
have recognized a constitutional right, 234 and therefore, should not bar the
demand of state intervention here.
The new dimension that Edelman seems to contribute to the scholarship
on this issue revolves around his equal protection argument.2 35 Edelman
argues that the poor face becoming an entrenched and permanent minority
estranged from electoral activity and bereft of political concern by the ma-
jority of the population who are not poor, such that the poor ought to be
230. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1987).
231. See, e.g., Krislov, supra note 225, at 245.
232. Edelman, supra note 230, at 23-25.
233. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (recognizing right to marry); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing right to abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (recognizing right to privacy).
234. Edelman, supra note 230, at 25, 38-43.
235. See id. at 43-48; see also Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One
View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term - Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment,
83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 41.
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considered a "suspect" class meriting judicial intervention.236 Moreover, the
poverty they endure is not generally a product of individuals who merely
lack the initiative to cope in a free market, but rather has been heavily im-
pacted by a host of governmental activity which indirectly developed, inten-
sified, and reinforced poverty. Therefore, the Court can now impose on the
government an affirmative obligation to relieve the poor of the most dire
circumstances of poverty through provision of a minimal subsistence
income.
Edelman understands fully the institutional and political limitations on
the Court and outlines the arenas that probably remain within the province
of the Congress or state legislatures. He acknowledges that some dicta in
recent cases do not augur well for his arguments, and thus, further action in
the federal courts, at least around the most controversial claims, may be
contra-indicated at this time.2 37 He suggests exploration of litigation under
state constitutions and state law.23 8 For example, some fruitful litigation has
occurred in state courts mandating provision of sheiter for the homeless.
2 39
Civil rights organizations might seek a grant to contract for extensive and
careful research of each state's constitutional provisions, and the potential
for litigation thereunder, affecting any facet of poverty. It is possible that
some legal service programs have done some of this work, but because they
do not now have fully staffed backup research units, a local office actively
involved with a steady flow of walk-in clients may find this kind of research
too time-consuming.
A consistent premise running through Edelman's article is that no pros-
pects of future democratic action to eliminate poverty remain. As stark pov-
erty afflicts a smaller portion of the population in sheer numbers, the poor
have less electoral clout. Moreover, by definition they do not have great
financial resources to discipline and intimidate elected officials or candidates
in need of campaign funds.24' Nor can they create favorable public opinion
through control of, or by purchasing access to, the media.
236. Edelman, supra note 230, at 35. For an elaboration of this line of argument, see Ely,
The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 5 (1978).
237. Edelman, supra note 230, at 40; see, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (deny-
ing that the government has an obligation to fund medically necessary abortions).
238. Edelman, supra note 230, at 41-42.
239. See McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987) (where
city provides emergency housing to the homeless, the housing must meet minimum standards);
Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983) (granting writ of mandamus directing De-
partment of Welfare to provide emergency shelter, food, and medical care to the homeless); see
also Werner, Homelessness: A Litigation Roundup, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1255 (1985).
240. See generally P. STERN, THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BUY (1988) (examines
the extent to which politician's have become dangerously dependent upon financial contribu-
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However, an inherent "Catch-22" dilemma undermines Edelman's ideas.
One wonders whether the very conditions that he describes as permanent for
the foreseeable future-namely an inert, invisible, and isolated poor-may
effectively preclude consideration of the new constitutional doctrine he pro-
poses. Commentators have suggested that a context of emergency or social
protest and struggle by ordinary citizens exerts an influence, unarticulated
by Supreme Court decisions, which stimulates emergence of new doctrine.2 4 '
Well-reasoned arguments (often developed by academicians), while essential,
rarely serve as the prime motive force. The labor movement and the Depres-
sion in the 1930's framed the Court's refusal to find a Constitutional man-
date for a laissez-faire economic regime.24 2 The second stage of the women's
movement preceded the Court's reinterpretation of the fourteenth amend-
ment, which facilitated its response to claims of sex discrimination.2 43
Professor Harold McDougall, using the civil rights movement as a para-
digm, hypothesizes that new ways of "making" law now exist, but that such
mechanisms heavily depend upon citizen-generated dialogue ("the interpre-
tative community") at the outset. Thereafter, progress is extended and
maintained by the unique way in which public interest lawyers function
("the implementation community"). 244
tions from political action committees). Moreover, the Court recently reinforced the unconsti-
tutionality of measures limitating financial expenditures in electoral activity. Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (expenditures
of political action committees).
241. Kairys, Book Review, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 930 (1978). "The periods of stringent
protection and enlargement of civil rights and civil liberties correspond to the periods in which
mass movements posing a credible challenge to the existing order have demanded such rights."
Id. at 943; see also e.g., Hague v. C.I.O, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Hague established for the first
time the doctrine that the state could not arbitrarily bar citizens from using the public streets
to engage in free speech. The Court, in effect, narrowed Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43
(1897) which had held to the contrary. Hague occurred in the context of active labor union
agitation.
242. The Court, in Texas & N.O. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
(1930), overruled, in effect, the doctrine announced in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 16
(1908), that it was unconstitutional for the Federal Government to prohibit an employer from
discharging a worker because of his union affiliation. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE
WAGNER ACT TO TAFT HARTLEY - A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR
RELATIONS 10-19 (1950).
243. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); see Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on
Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, 117, 130-39, in THE POLITICS OF LAW - A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (discussing the break that Frontiero represented
from previous Supreme Court equal protection doctrine regarding females).
244. McDougall, Social Movements, Law and Implementation: A Critical Dimension for
the New Legal Process, (forthcoming 75 CORNELL L. REV. Issue 1 (1989)).
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B. Implementing the Constitutional Litigation Strategy
If the analysis that breakthroughs in expanding protective constitutional
doctrine depend upon an active social movement is correct, one wonders
whether and how activists can generate such a movement on behalf of the
poor. This presents a serious dilemma because group formation requires
leadership, and such leadership optimally emerges from the group itself.
However, extreme poverty exacts a devastating toll on personality, and sim-
ple individual and family survival demands an enormous expenditure of en-
ergy. Thus, these demands severely drain human resources needed for more
long-range group goals. Moreover, strong incentives exist for natively bright
persons in the ghetto to apply their intelligence, with cunning and shrewd-
ness, toward crime and other forms of exploitation.
It may now be necessary for lawyers to step in and perform two roles-
quasi-leader and quasi-legal technician. As quasi-legal technician, the law-
yer may serve as a spark for mobilization of the disadvantaged. While a
number of commentators have counseled against "high risk" constitutional
litigation because of the prospects of a loss, at least one commentator has
another view:
[T]he mere assertion of the [constitutional] right, regardless of
initial success in the courts, may be useful as a political issue
around which to organize poor blacks, for litigation and other
means of advocacy foster social reform more effectively when used
as an instrument of political mobilization than when used merely
for asserting and realizing rights.245
Perhaps lawyers in the legal service programs and volunteers from the
private bar could also perform this role of quasi-leader.2 46 The legal service
programs face one strong impediment-enormous caseloads that preoccupy
staff lawyers, making them unavailable for organizing efforts.247 Both legal
245. Calmore, Exploring the Significance of Race and Class in Representing the Black Poor,
61 OR. L. REV. 201, 242 (1982).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45 for a discussion of The Washington Law-
yers' Committee's participation with parent groups regarding education issues.
247. The adamant reluctance of Legal Services Corporation (LSC) to orchestrate political
activities in pursuit of a broader civil rights agenda because of a shortage of resources is aptly
illustrated by a recently proposed federal regulation that would prohibit recipients of LSC
funding from becoming involved in litigation, research, or any other activity related to redis-
tricting. See 54 Fed. Reg. 10,569 (1989) (proposed Mar. 14, 1989).
While erosion of voting rights poses one of the greatest and most direct threats to empower-
ment of the poor, as this Article has argued (see supra notes 193-216 and accompanying text),
the current LSC believes that its focus should be on "providing quality day-to-day legal assist-
ance to eligible poor clients facing specific legal problems." LSC Proposes Regulation Prohibit-
ing Redistricting, Legal Serv. Rec., Mar./Apr. 1989, at 1, col. 1. Furthermore, it believes that
"redistricting activities are contrary to LSC's congressional mandate to provide basic legal
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service programs and private volunteers face another impediment, namely
that traditional legal education inadequately teaches and develops organiza-
tional skills. Specially designed post law school training could, perhaps, ad-
dress the latter concern. Reform litigation aimed at building a constitutional
right (either federal or state) which would require the state to appoint and
compensate counsel for indigents in civil cases might ameliorate the case
overload burden. States now enforce such an obligation in practically all
criminal cases. Some states tentatively support the claim in civil cases where
the courts have characterized the indigent as facing the loss of a very impor-
tant right, such that due process or equal protection requires the appoint-
ment of counsel. 24 8 Extending the concept of appointed and compensated
counsel to its outer limits, primarily under state constitutions for the foresee-
able future, would relieve the caseload pressures on local legal service offices,
thus freeing them for the organizing tasks outlined above.
A larger problem exists, however, impeding representation of the poor
through legal action. If the poor are afforded advantages in isolation from
other segments of the population, generating the needed financial and
human resources or effecting a change in the ambivalent attitude of the pub-
lic at-large towards the poor will become even more difficult than at present.
A shift in public attitudes generated by past movements may be critical to
the acceptance of new doctrines by higher courts that may be silently sensi-
tive to anti-democratic institutions' criticisms. One must wonder whether
the structure of current civil rights advocacy groups or Legal Service offices
will adequately meet the tasks of the future or whether larger and broader-
based public interest firms would be a more efficient vehicle.
Despite its focus on discrimination against blacks, the Civil Rights move-
ment, especially up to the passage of the 1960's legislation, drew support
from many segments of the populace outside the black community. Indeed,
those organizations of the 1960's, which either became or were perceived by
the public as turning sharply "nationalistic" or "ultra-extremist," lost public
support and collapsed (e.g. Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee,
Black Panther Party). Moreover, the new civil rights legislation protected
many groups other than blacks. For example, while Title VII included wo-
men in a back-handed attempt to derail the legislation,2 49 the subsequent
assistance to the poor" and that such political activity "diverts resources from eligible clients
to ineligible members of affected populations." Id. at 7, col. 2.
248. Redfield, A Statutory Proposal Compensating Attorneys Appointed to Represent Indi-
gent Civil Defendants, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 195, 200-04 (1988).
249. Developments in the Law--Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1167 (1971); see also 110 CONG. REC. 2,581 (1964) (remarks of
Rep. Green).
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utilization of the statute by women gave them protection against employ-
ment disadvantages unique to, or more pressing for, their group (e.g. sexual
harassment, exclusion of pregnancy as a medical benefit). Some may argue
that the black movement has its strongest ally in the feminist movement.25 °
The Court's holding in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,25 ' which was initially
designed to protect blacks by removing standards that were irrelevant to job
performance, has provided the impetus for business to look more carefully at
common, long standing practices to judge their true efficiency. White male
executives primarily benefitted from the Civil Rights Act barring discrimina-
tion on the basis of age. The resulting improvements for large portions of
the population other than minorities has probably secured protections for
blacks as part of our legal landscape.
Public interest firms ought to highly prioritize advocacy that benefits the
poor and minorities and concomitantly can show other public benefits. For
example, litigation to secure a right to counsel on behalf of indigents in civil
cases could extend to a demand for state subsidization of counsel for persons
from the lower-middle and middle classes who could not afford the substan-
tial attorney fees associated with civil and criminal litigation. Professor Al-
fred Blumrosen argues that civil rights organizations must now engage a
very broad spectrum of laws that may impact more intensely on minorities
and the poor, but which, with appropriate reforms, would bring relief to a
broader spectrum of the public."2 For example, the shift of jobs abroad in
major industries, like steel and automobile manufacturing, especially affects
minorities. Blumrosen advocates a push for tariff policies that would raise
the wages of foreign workers, thus diminishing them as a pool of cheap la-
bor.25 3 Similarly, Professor Cornelius Peck suggests that legislation requir-
ing public representation on the boards of directors of major corporations,
such as the steel corporations, would assure public scrutiny of important
moves (e.g. plant closings) that affect a community. 254 Peck also suggests
extension of our laws prohibiting the interstate shipment of goods made by
child labor or in violation of minimum wages to foreign commerce as an-
other way to prevent unfair competition from exploited foreign workers.25 5
Blumrosen recommends that civil rights advocates concentrate on tax pol-
250. See Bergman, Is There a Conflict Between Racial Justice and Women's Liberation?, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 805 (1985).
251. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
252. Blumrosen, supra note 136, at 307.
253. See id. at 308-10.
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icy, bankruptcy, antitrust and drug abuse laws, as future arenas for
concern.
256
In this spirit, the public interest law firm of the future should staff, or
engage in active consultation with, attorneys educated in a number of areas
that they have not previously seen as relevant (e.g. tax law, international
law, criminal law, and communications law) to determine whether alterna-
tive ways of litigating or amending legislation exist that would have desirable
benefits. For example, no one in the civil rights community appears to have
suggested amendments to the tax code to permit adjustments for successful
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases who must pay higher taxes be-
cause they recover back pay covering a number of past years in a single year.
As another example, a municipality can purchase, under eminent domain,
the plant of a company threatening to shut down, thus averting widespread
unemployment in a community.257 The development of rights to basic se-
curity in the international law context should relate to domestic American
law. A civil action under the Racketeer Influence and Corruption Act
(RICO)25 possibly could protect migrant workers from corporations that
persistently break the criminal laws designed to protect such workers.
Greater consultation and interaction between civil rights specialists and
those possessing other kinds of expertise might result in a cross-fertilization
of ideas and a richness of approaches.
The presence of lawyer-journalists, and other persons with expertise in
negotiating with the media, could possibly enhance the work of a public
interest firm. The drift of public opinion toward a more conservative vein,
prompted largely, according to William J. Wilson, by the heightened visibil-
ity of conservative writers with much greater resources than their liberal
counterparts, has caused much of the despair about ameliorating the condi-
tion of the poor and minorities.25 9 In order to achieve some of the goals
outlined in this Article, liberal writers will have to reassume the prominence
they had in the early 1960's. One analyst hypothesizes that fewer liberal
intellectuals actively engage in public discourse because so many are now in
academe, and the requirements for tenure and professional respect do not
encourage less-than-scholarly publication in popular journals and
magazines.2 ° Professors Edelman, Michaelman, and Ely carefully and elo-
256. Blumrosen, supra note 136, at 307-08, 311-12.
257. Lynd, Towards a Not-For-Profit Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisi-
tion and Use of Industrial Property, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 13, 24-26 (1987).
258. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
259. See W. WILSON, supra note 61, at 13-18.
260. R. JACOBY, THE LAST INTELLECTUALS: AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE AGE OF
ACADEME 4-7 (1987).
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quently argue for a constitutional right to relief from extreme poverty; how-
ever, their writings appear in professional journals not accessible to the lay
public--even the educated lay public. Thus, the task of public communica-
tion and explication of new social reforms could devolve on the staff of pub-
lic interest institutions, like the Lawyers' Committee.
With some exceptions, public institutions cannot rely solely on journalists
in the mainstream media, who often lack a full appreciation of all the intrica-
cies of the law. Hence, the persons best-suited for the tasks described herein
would be lawyer-journalists. In addition to good writers with a legal back-
ground, this approach would also require persons who have special expertise
in gaining entry into the media and in "staging" events accessible and clear
to the public. Legal material can be especially problematic on this score.
The civil rights movement could not have survived without its "unpaid
staff" who worked for the television and print media. The legal and moral
issues were simpler then-something more sophisticated is needed now. Ob-
viously, many of the reforms suggested throughout this Article unequivo-
cally require a nurturing and mobilization of public support for the equitable
adjustments contemplated.
